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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GOLD STANDARD, INC.,
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vs.
AMERICAN BARRICK RESOURCES
CORPORATION; BARRICK MERCUR
GOLD MINES, INC.; GETTY OIL
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Defendants.
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GETTY MINING COMPANY,
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i?i copy of Getty's Petition ioi Order to Uhow Cause is
attached hereto Exhibit W A,"
^ Copies of the memoranda submitted to the district court
by the parties in this matter a *- attached hereto as Exhibi ts •"'^"
through #I*"D v
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CV86-374, slip. op. (3rd Dist. Ut. April 1, 1988).3

On April

13, 1988, the district court entered its final order, denying
relief.4

Getty

This Petition

for Permission to Appeal the

district court's Order follows.
In accordance with Rule 8 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court, Getty submits the following:

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case arises from a dispute over the ownership and
operation of the Mercur Gold Mine located southeast of Tooele,
Utah.

Plaintiff Gold Standard, Inc. brought this action against

Getty and others, alleging various theories of liability based
principally
Operating
December

upon

Getty's

Agreement
11, 1973.

conduct

between
Among

Getty
other

with
and

respect
Gold

to

a written

Standard

allegations, Gold

dated

Standard

asserts that a feasibility study concerning the Mercur Mine,
delivered by Getty in 1981, did not satisfy the provisions of the
Operating Agreement and that, as a result, Gold Standard was
unable to obtain financing to fund its share of project costs.
Gold Standard argues that it was then improperly converted from a
25% working interest holder in the mine to a 15% net profits
3

A copy of the district court's opinion is attached hereto
as Exhibit "E."
4

A copy of the court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit
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interest

holder

pursuant

to

the Operating

Agreement.

Gold

Standard alleges damages in excess of $900,000,000.
Without

notifying

Getty's

counsel,

Gold

Standard's

counsel contacted former key Getty management employees whose
acts or omissions while employed by Getty form the basis of Gold
Standard's allegations.5

Virtually every one of the former Getty

employees contacted by Gold Standard's counsel or identified to
be

contacted

was

party

to

privileged

communications

which

directly relate to the issues raised by this lawsuit.6

Upon

D

The key Getty employees contacted ex parte by Gold
Standard's counsel include Robert P. Blanc, Vice President of
Getty Mining Company, Robert L. Hautala, Production Manager of
Getty's United States Mineral District, responsible for United
States mining projects including the Mercur Project; Joseph Berg,
in-house counsel for Getty with responsibility for advising Getty
on Mercur-related issues from 1981 to 1984; and Charles J.
Kundert, Minerals Engineering Manager, responsible for all
engineering functions of the mining group.
Gold Standard's
counsel met with and interviewed Kundert and Hautala.
Gold
Standard also prepared an affidavit for Kundert to sign in
conjunction with their interview. Blanc and Berg were contacted
by Gold Standard's counsel but declined further ex parte contact
with them.
In addition to these contacts, Gold Standard's
president has stated in an affidavit that Gold Standard intends
to have its counsel contact additional former management
employees, including Charles Trimble, Getty's District Minerals
Landman who assisted in negotiating the terms of the written
agreement; and Cecil H. Smith, District Minerals Exploration
Manager for Getty at the time of the original contract
negotiations.
b

Getty's log of privileged documents reveals that each of
the management employees contacted or identified by Gold Standard
was party to a number of privileged communications.
Since
privileged communications need not be written to be protected,
the privilege log is only a partial listing of the privileged
communications to which these former management employees were a
party and which Getty has a right to protect.
GET-bjr.020
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becoming

aware

of

However,

despite

the

these

contacts,

Getty's

counsel

Gold

Standard's

objections,

objected.
counsel

persisted in the contacts until Getty filed its Petition seeking
an order prohibiting future contacts and imposing sanctions for
those contacts which had already occurred.

II.

STATEMENT OF QUESTION OF LAW

The questions of law involved in this case include:
1.

Whether Rule 4.2 of the Utah Rules of Professional

Conduct, which was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court effective
January

1,

1988,

prohibits

Gold

Standard's

counsel

from

contacting ex parte former Getty management employees whose acts
or omissions relating to the Mercur Mine may be imputed to Getty
for purposes of this case.
2.
104(a)

of

Whether Gold Standard's counsel violated DR 7the

superseded

Revised

Rules

of

Professional

Responsibility by their previous ex parte contacts with former
Getty management employees.
3.

Whether Getty is entitled to sanctions against Gold

Standard for the ex parte contacts which have already occurred,
including the exclusion at trial of the information obtained
through such contacts.
III.

REASONS WHY GETTY'S APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED

Rule 8 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides
that the court may grant an appeal from an interlocutory order
G E T - b j r . 020
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"if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may
materially affect the final decision, or that a determination of
the correctness of such order before final judgment will better
serve the administration

and

interests of justice."

As is

evidenced by this court's recent decision in Trail Mountain Coal
Co, v, Arco Coal Sales Co,, 749 P.2d 637 (Utah 1988) (interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to compel), an
interlocutory appeal from a pre-trial discovery order may be
granted when the appeal is based upon unsettled questions of law
which may affect substantial rights.

See also, Utah v. Petty, 17

Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914, 916 (1966)(intermediate appeal granted
in

discovery

dispute

involving

interrogatories

because

"the

problem here presented will have an important bearing on this
lawsuit" and "is one which is continually recurring in discovery
procedure under the new rules").
A.

Getty's Substantial Rights are In Jeopardy.

It is Getty's position that opposing counsels7 ex parte
contacts with former Getty management employees is improper and
exceeds the bounds of permissible discovery.
and interest

in protecting

opposing counsel.

itself

Getty has a right

from such overreaching by

Moreover, such ex parte contacts jeopardize

Getty's attorney-client privilege and effectively deny Getty the
right to protect privileged information.

The district court's

order in this matter places responsibility for protecting Getty's
GET-bjr.020
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attorney-client
including

privilege

counsel

for

in

the

Getty's

hands
party

of

third

opponent

parties,

and

former

employees7 who cannot be expected to accurately identify the
parameters of the privilege.
The district court's Order involves questions which go
to the heart of the attorney-client relationship.

The ethical

rules prohibiting or restricting direct contacts with an adverse
party, absent consent of that party's counsel, are essential to
the exercise
counsel.

of a party's right to effective assistance of

The attorney-client privilege is equally important, but

is only as strong as a client's ability to protect it.
B.

Post-Trial Remedies are Inadequate.

An interlocutory appeal of the district court's order
is necessary to protect Getty's rights.

It will be impossible to

place a dollar value on the damages which Getty will sustain as a
result

of

disclosure

impermissible
of

privileged

ex

parte

contacts

information.

or to

There

annul

the

only

two

are

potential methods of remedying the effects of improper ex parte
contacts.

The first, and clearly most effective method, is to

prohibit the contacts before they occur.
available

means

occurred,

is

1

the

of

redressing

imposition

contacts

of

which

restrictions

See Slip op. at 5.

GET-bjr.020

The second, and only
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have

already

on the use of

information obtained as a result of the impermissible contacts.
Neither of these remedies is available following trial.
Even the granting of a new trial following an appeal
would be ineffective to protect Getty's rights.
this matter are engaging

The parties in

in extensive discovery.

Following

months of such discovery and a trial on the merits, it will be
practically

impossible

to

sort

out that

evidence which was

obtained through impermissible ex parte contacts or through a
breach of the attorney-client privilege.
C.

This Appeal Serves the Administration of Justice.

An interpretation and decision by this court on the
scope and intent of Rule 4.2

of the newly adopted Rules of

Professional Conduct will serve the administration and interests
of justice.

If Getty's position is correct, then additional ex

parte contact with former Getty management employees is improper,
Getty is entitled to protection and further contacts by Gold
Standard's attorneys should be prohibited.

If the court deems

that sanctions for past contacts are appropriate, such sanctions
can be imposed prior to trial and final judgment.
The district court acknowledged that there is a "split
of authority on this issue [of ex parte contact with former
management employees]."

Slip op. at 2.

Where a substantial

basis exists for a difference of opinion on a question of law as
to

which

GET-bjr.020

appellate

resolution
8

may

protect

a

party

from

irreparable injury or resolve an issue of general importance in
the administration of justice, the court should exercise its
discretion

and

grant

the

interlocutory

appeal.

This

is

particularly true in cases, such as the case at bar, where the
issue is governed by a newly adopted rule.

Utah v. Petty, 17

Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914, 916 (1966).
The Comment to Rule 4.2 clearly suggests that ex parte
contacts with at least some former employees is prohibited under
the Rule.

The Comment states that Rule 4.2 prohibits ex parte

contact with current managerial employees and
any other person whose act or omission in
connection with the matter [in dispute] may be
imputed to the organization for purpose of civil
or criminal liability or whose statement may
constitute an admission on the part of the
organization.
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2, Comment (1988) (emphasis
added).
In denying Getty's Petition, the district court focused
solely on the second part of the Comment and ruled that, because
a

former

employee's

current

statements

cannot

constitute

admissions on the part of the corporation, ex parte contact with
such employees is not contemplated by the Rule.
the Comment, however, is disjunctive.

The sentence in

The first part of the

disjunction is not restricted to current statements or acts but
expressly covers "any other person" whose acts or omissions in
connection with the subject of the litigation can be imputed to
GET-bjr.020
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the corporation.

The permissibility of ex parte contacts does

not, and should not, depend upon the fortuitous factor of whether
an employee remains employed by the corporation throughout the
course of subsequent litigation.

Despite the clear intent of the

language in the Comment to Rule 4.2, the district courts opinion
makes no reference to the Comment or its language.
Moreover, the district court cited no authority to
support its ruling.

Several federal district courts have stated

that Rule 4.2 prohibits contacts with former managerial employees
whose

past

acts

or

omissions

liability in pending litigation.

form

the

basis

for

asserted

See Porter v. Arco Metals Co. ,

642 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Mont. 1986); Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678
F. Supp. 250 (D. Kan. 1988) .

A handful of state bar opinions

have split on the issue with the majority concluding that such
contacts are permissible.8

A few other judicial decisions have

involved ex parte contacts with current or former employees but
have not involved contacts with former management employees whose
past acts or omissions are the subject of a later dispute.

See,

e.g., Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36
(D. Mass. 1987) ; Wright v. Group Health Hospital, 103 Wash. 2d
192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984).

b

None of these advisory opinions, however, comes from a
state where Rule 4.2 was the controlling Rule at the time the
opinion was issued. For the most part, they expressly involve
interpretations of DR7-104(a).
G E T - b j r . 020
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The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

adopted

Rules

of

Professional Conduct as the controlling provisions on attorney
conduct in Utah.

A number of these rules, including rules on

conflicts of interest, ex parte contacts, and confidentiality,
are designed to protect the interests of those who deal with
attorneys.

Rule

4.2

is of critical

importance

in imposing

restrictions upon the boundaries of permissible discovery. Thus,
the issue of ex parte contact with a party opponent's former
employees is a matter of significant importance in the discovery
process of this litigation, as well as other litigation.
In
following

all

judgment

improper contacts.

cases
will

where
be

this

wholly

issue

arises,

inadequate

to

a

ruling

remedy

the

Under such circumstances, it is proper and

important for the Supreme Court to exercise its discretion and
consider this issue on interlocutory appeal.
IV.

REASONS WHY APPEAL MAY ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION
If this issue is not decided on appeal prior to final

judgment, then Getty's only remedy would be an appeal following
trial and final judgment.
the

contacts

were

If the court rules at that time that

improper,

it

will

be

very

difficult

to

ascertain the extent of the tainted evidence presented at trial
or the impact of that evidence on the outcome of the case. A new
trial

may

granting
GET-bjr.020

be

the

Getty's

only,

although

Petition

for
11

imperfect, remedy.
Interlocutory

Appeal

Thus,
would

materially shorten the time required for final resolution of this
litigation.
Moreover, this appeal would not expedite the discovery
in this matter.

The former employees that Getty seeks to protect

are those who played key roles in the decisions and actions
forming the basis for plaintiff's allegations.

Thus, whether or

not plaintiff's attorneys are permitted to interview these former
Getty

management

employees

ex parte, these

individuals will

undoubtedly be deposed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Getty hereby petitions
the court to grant it leave to appeal the interlocutory order of
the district court in this matter.
DATED this % 7

day of April, 1988.
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS

By: JJuJ

U

{JU<^JU#

Stephfen G.^Crockett, Esq.
Attorneys for Getty Oil Company and
Getty Mining Company

GET-bjr.020
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

hereby

certify

that

a true

and correct

copy of the

foregoing "Petition for Permission to Appeal From Interlocutory
Order" was mailed, postage prepaid, this c^n-tt^
1988, to the following:
Gordon L. Roberts
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James Lowrie
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Robert M. McDonald
47 West 200 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

day of April,

Tab A

Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (A0766)
Robert S. Clark, Esq. (A4015)
Brian Romriell, Esq. (A4757)
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS
185 South State Street
Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Mark H. Reinhardt, Esq.
4601 DTC Boulevard
P.O. Box 2100
Denver, Colorado 80237
Attorneys for Defendants Getty
Oil Company and Getty Mining Company
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GOLD STANDARD, INC.,
1

PETITION FOR ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE

l

Civil NO. CV-86-374

Plaintiff,

vs.
AMERICAN BARRICK RESOURCES
CORPORATION; BARRICK MERCUR
GOLD MINES, INC.; GETTY OIL
COMPANY; GETTY MINING COMPANY;
GETTY GOLD MINE COMPANY; and
and JOHN DOES I through 10,
Defendants.
Defendants Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining Company
(collectively, "Getty"),
requiring

plaintiff

hereby petition the Court for an order

Gold

Standard,

Inc.

to

show

cause why

sanctions should not be imposed against them by reason that

plaintiff's counsel have contacted and interviewed, on an ex
parte basis, former management employees of Getty in violation of
DR 7-104(A) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the
Utah

State

Bar, and

of Rule

4.2

of the

Proposed Rules of

Professional Responsibility*
To remedy the improper contacts which have occurred and
which may continue to occur absent a court order, Getty requests
that the Court order the following sanctions:
1.
contact

by

Order immediate cessation of any further ex parte
plaintiff's

counsel with

former Getty

employees,

absent leave of court or consent from Getty's counsel;
2.

Require plaintiff to immediately

identify every

former Getty employee that has been contacted or interviewed by
plaintiff's counsel;
3.

Require plaintiff to produce all documents, taped

statements, written statements, and all other materials received
from former Getty employees;
4.

Require production of all written notes taken or

summaries prepared by any person, including plaintiff's counsel,
which record or were made during or after those contacts or
interviews; and
5.

Prohibit use of the statements and materials at

trial or for any other purpose.
CET-C019.RK

2

This

Petition

is

supported

by

the accompanying

Memorandum in Support of Petition for Order to Show Cause.
DATED this

r?

/u

day of November, 1987.
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS

By: .Ltd

Ch*j*tr

'Stepmen G. Crockett, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants Getty Oil
Company and Getty Mining Company

GET-G019.RK
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the S{

/LL

day of November, 1987, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing "Memorandum in Support of
Petition for Order to Show Cause" was hand-delivered to the
following:
James S. Lowrie, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gordon L. Roberts. Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street
Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert M. McDonald, Esq.
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

CET-C019.RK
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TabB

Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (A0766)
Robert S. Clark, Esq. (A4015)
Brian Romriell, Esq. (A4757)
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS
185 South State Street
Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Mark W. Reinhardt, Esq.
4601 DTC Boulevard
P.O. Box 2100
Denver, Colorado 80237
Attorneys for Defendants Getty
Oil Company and Getty Mining Company
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GOLD STANDARD, INC.,

]

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE

1|

vs.

;

AMERICAN BARRICK RESOURCES
CORPORATION; BARRICK MERCUR
GOLD MINES, INC.; GETTY OIL
COMPANY; GETTY MINING COMPANY;
GETTY GOLD MINE COMPANY; and
and JOHN DOES I through 10,

i

Civil No. CV-86-374

Defendants.
Defendants Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining Company
(collectively/

"Getty")

submit

the

following

Support of their Petition for Order to Show Cause.

Memorandum

in

J. FACT?
Plaintiff Gold Standard, Inc. ("Gold Standard*) brought
this action against Getty and others, alleging various theories
of liability based principally upon Getty's conduct with respect
to an Operating Agreement dated December 11, 1973.

Among other

allegations, Gold Standard asserts that the feasibility study
delivered by Getty in 1981 did not satisfy the requirements of
the

Operating

Agreement,

and

that

in

1982 Getty

improperly

converted Gold Standard from a 25% working interest to a 15% net
profits interest.
The key Getty employees

involved

in delivering the

feasibility study and in the conversion included Robert P. Blanc,
Vice

President

of

Getty

Mining

Company;

Robert

L. Hautala,

Production Manager of the Mercur Project; and Joseph E. Berg III,
Esq., in-house counsel for Getty with responsibility for advising
Getty on Mercur-related issues from 1981 to 1984.
Getty management-level

employees

Other former

involved with Mercur include

Mike Beck, a financial analyst, and Charles J. Kundert, Getty's
Minerals Engineering Manager.
individuals

was

party

to

Virtually

privileged

every one of these

communications

directly

relating to the issues raised by the lawsuit.
Despite the central role and privileged knowledge of these
individuals, attorneys for plaintiff Gold Standard, Inc. have,
CET-C017.rk
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without notice to Getty's attorneys and without leave of court,
met

with

and/or

contacted

employees of Getty.

each

of

these

former

managerial

At the deposition of Scott L. Smith, Gold

Standard's President and CEO, taken on October 28, 1987, Smith
testified that he and his counsel met with Hautala, discussed
issues in the lawsuit, and reviewed a number of documents.1
Getty is also informed that plaintiff's counsel has met with
Kundert, who was Getty's Minerals Engineering Manager from 1979
to 1984.

Plaintiff's counsel has contacted but not met with

Blanc, Berg, and Beck.
Following the contact of Blanc, Berg, and Beck, Getty
notified Gold Standard

in writing of its objections to such

contact through letters and telephone calls from Parsons, Behle &
Latimer

(who represented

Getty at that time).

The letters

attached as Exhibits B, C, and D reflect Getty's objections and
Gold Standard's response.

Despite such objections, it appears

that Gold Standard has persisted in its ex parte contact and
persuaded

at

least

Hautala

relating to the lawsuit.

and

Kundert

to

make

statements

It is possible that other former Getty

employees have been contacted or interviewed and Getty may even
yet be unaware of such contact.

1

A copy of the relevant pages from the reporter's draft
version of the deposition transcript are attached as Exhibit "k."
CET-C017.rk
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In their respective roles as managerial employees and
legal advisor of the corporation, these individuals were party to
privileged
counsel.

communications
The

ex

parte

between
contact

the
set

corporation
forth

above

and
may

its
have

jeopardized, and could continue to jeopardize, the privileged
nature of these communications.

Since Getty's counsel was not

informed of and did not participate in the ex parte contacts,
Getty could not protect its privilege and cannot now assess the
extent to which its position and privilege have been compromised.
Unless the court, among other things, prohibits further ex parte
contact with Getty's former management personnel, there is a
danger that such contact will continue to occur and may unfairly
prejudice Getty's position in this litigation and its attorneyclient privilege.

II.

A.

EX PARTE CONTACT IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The Rules of Professional Conduct Prohibit Ex
Parte Contact With the Opposing Party.

Ex parte contact by an attorney with an adverse party's
employees and former employees is controlled by the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
involved

The discovery actions of the attorneys

in this case are governed by the Revised Rules of

Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar ("Revised Rules'').
CET-C017.rk
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These rules are modeled after the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The relevant rule provides:

During the course of his
client a lawyer shall not:

representation

of a

(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate
on the subject of the representation with a party
he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that
matter unless he has the prior consent of the
lawyer representing such other party or is
authorized by law to do so.
DR 7-104 (A) (1985).

The language of DR 7-104 is nearly identical

to that of Rule 4.2 of the "Rules of Professional Discipline"
(which will replace the Revised Rules on January 1, 1988, and
which are patterned after the more recently enacted ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct).2

Courts interpreting DR 7-104

frequently look to Rule 4.2 and cases construing it as authority
for the intent and reach of DR 7-104.

This court likewise should

look to Rule 4.2 and cases construing it as persuasive authority
on the scope and intent of the prohibition against ex parte
contact of an adverse party.
2

Rule 4.2 of the Proposed Rules provides:

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to
do so.
Rule 4.2# Rules of Professional Conduct
referred to as the "Proposed Rules").

(1987)

hereinafter

The prohibition under DR 7*104 and Rule 4.2 serves
several vital functions.

One important aim is to "preserve the

proper functioning of the legal profession" by ensuring that in
making decisions relating to a dispute a client has the benefit
of the advice of the legal expert he has employed to assist him.
American Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. No.
108 (1934); see also In re Korea Shipping Corp.. 621 F. Supp.
164, 167 (D. Alaska 1985); In re McCaffrey. 275 Or. 23, 549 P.2d
666, 668 (1976).

More recently, the ABA has stated that the rule

is intended to "protect[] the represented party from the superior
knowledge and skill of the opposing lawyer." American Bar Ass'n,
Annotated

Model

Rules

of

Professional

Conduct

268

(1984)

(construing Rule 4.2). The ex parte contact by opposing counsel
in this case frustrates the purposes and intent of the Rules of
Conduct and, as explained below, violates its provisions.
B.

The Prohibition Against Ex Parte Contact with an
Adverse Party Applies to Contact with Former
Management-Level Employees.
Both DR 7-104 and Rule 4.2 prohibit ex parte contact

with a party opponent.
simple

matter

to

In the case of an individual, it is a

identify

the

party.

In

the

case

of a

corporation, it is more difficult to define "party," yet the
protection against ex parte contact is equally important to the
preservation of the corporation's rights.
GET-G017.rk
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In the corporate context, although the corporation is
the party, its rights and interests are represented by thirdparty individuals. As a result, protection for a corporation can
come

only

through

prohibiting

represent the corporation.

contact

with

individuals

who

The official comment to Proposed Rule

4.2 discusses the application of the rule in this context:
In the case of an organization, this Rule
prohibits communications by a lawyer for one party
concerning the matter in representation with
persons having a managerial responsibility on
behalf of the organization, and with any other
person whose act or omission in connection with
that matter may be imputed to the organization for
purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose
statement may constitute an admission on the part
of the organization. • . .
Proposed Rule 4.2 (1987) (emphasis added).3
Since the constituency of a corporation's management
may change, merely prohibiting contact with current management
personnel

of

corporation.

a

corporation
The

comment

does not adequately
acknowledges

this

protect the

inadequacy

by

providing that the prohibition against ex parte contact of an
adverse party applies to contact with "any other person whose act
or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability."
3

Although the comment to Rule 4.2 is not yet formally
adopted in Utah, it should be followed in this case since Rule
4.2 is nearly identical to DR 7-104 and since the comment does
not alter the content of the rule but merely clarifies its scope.
CET-C017.rk
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The corporate "party" must include all those who had
power to "speak for the corporation" at the period in time in the
corporation when the incidents or actions forming the basis of
the dispute arose•

The rights of a corporation with respect to a

particular matter cannot depend on the coincidence of whether or
not management personnel involved have ceased their employment
with the corporation•

The acts or omissions of Getty's former

management employees will clearly be sought to be imputed to
Getty in this lawsuit.
personnel

Consequently, such former management

fall within the scope of the comment's prohibition

against contact with "other persons."4

Therefore, contact with

such former employees is prohibited absent leave of court or
consent of counsel.5

4

There is also a danger that a court may admit the
statements of a former employee as admissions against the
corporation.
See American Craft Hosiery Corp, v. Damascus
Hosiery Mills, Inc.. 575 F. Supp. 816, 818-19 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (as
discussed in Miller & Calfo, Ex parte Contact with Employees and
Former Employees of a Corporate Adversary: Is it Ethical?. 42
Bus. Law. 1053, 1059 n.29 (1987)).
&

The corollary to this rule is that some current
employees may not be covered under the rule in situations where
their actions cannot be imputed to the corporation and their
statements are not admissible as admissions of the corporate
party. The critical factor, then, is not whether a person is a
current or former employee, but whether the person had managerial
responsibilities relating to the dispute between the parties.
CET-G017.rk
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The

cases

interpreting

consistent with this approach.

DR

7*104 and Rule 4.2 are

The court in Porter v. Arco

Metals Co.. 642 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Mont. 1986), acknowledged that
a different rule applies to management personnel than to lowlevel employees.

The court indicated that interviews with

former managerial employees is improper under the attorney-client
privilege doctrine and Rule 4.2.

Ex parte contact of lower level

current and former employees of the opponent was allowed, but the
court cautioned that such ex parte contact was permitted only
so long as plaintiff does not attempt to interview
present or former employees with managerial
responsibilities concerning the matter in
litigation, and does not inquire into privileged
areas of communication*
Id. at 1118.
In an unpublished decision, another federal district
court held that Rule 4.2 prohibited ex parte contact with certain
former management employees.
Harlem-Inwood
(S.D.N.Y.
Cenfed

Mental

1983),

Health

vacated

library, Dist

Sperber v. Washington Heiahts-W.
Council. Inc.. Civ. No. 82-7428

and withdrawn

file)

(available on LEXIS,

(attached as Exhibit "E").6

In

* Although the Order was withdrawn, the court's reasoning
and treatment of the issue is useful since the contact in ffperber
bears close resemblance to the contact in this case.
Other
courts have cited the Sperber decision despite the fact that it
was subsequently withdrawn. See, e.g., Amarin Plastics, Jnc. v.
Maryland C U D Corp.. 116 F.R.D. 36, 39-40 (D. Mass. 1987).
CET-C01?-rk
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Sperber.

the

termination.

plaintiff
In

the

sued

course

the
of

defendant

discovery,

for

the

wrongful

plaintiff's

attorneys contacted ex parte the former executive director and
former

administrator

of

the

defendant

regarding

the

case.

Neither was a party to the suit or formally represented by the
defendant's attorneys.

The court emphasized the importance of

distinguishing among former employees according to whether they
served in management positions and whether they were "actors for
the organization with respect to the conduct giving rise to [the]
lawsuit."

The court concluded:
Even if [the former employees'] statements to [the
opposing counsel] cannot be treated as admissions
by the organization, their actions and motives
are, nevertheless, precisely those which plaintiff
seeks to impute to the organization.
The fact
that [they] are now former employees does not
alter this relation or connection with defendant
or its potential civil liability based on their
conduct as its highest officers.

LEXIS Slip op. at 7.
In another unpublished decision, the Federal District
Court for the District of Nevada ruled that ex parte contact with
a highly-placed

former employee of the opposing party was an

improper violation of Canon 9 of the Mode Code which prohibits
the appearance of impropriety.

American Protection Ins. Co. v.

MGM Grand Hotel. No. CV-LV-82-26 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 1986).

Prior

to the district court's decision in this opinion, the Ninth
GET-C017.rk
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Circuit had previously ruled that the ex parte contact with the
former employee infringed upon the attorney-client privilege and
violated Rule 4.2.

American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand

Hotel. Nos. 83-2674, 83-2728 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 1984).
Circuit

opinion

was

later

withdrawn

on

procedural

The Ninth
grounds.

American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel—Las Vegas, Inc..
765 F. 925 (9th Cir. 1985).
When

a

case

involves

lower

level

employees

whose

testimony is sought regarding their role as third-party witnesses
to

incidents

permitted

occurring

within

an

organization,

ex parte contact without

status as current or former employees.

regard

courts

have

to the employees'

For example, in Wright v.

Group Health Hospital. 103 Wash. 2d 192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984), the
most frequently cited case permitting ex parte contact, the court
permitted ex parte interviews with current and former nurses of a
hospital who witnessed an alleged incident of malpractice.
court

stated that the

The

function of DR 7-104 was to preclude

interviewing those employees who have authority to bind the
corporation.

It further found that the attorney-client privilege

did not apply to the testimony of nurses involved in the case.
As a result, the court permitted interviews of the nurses.7
7

One recent case permitted ex parte contact with a former
executive employee where the executive left the corporation
before the circumstances occurred which led to the litigation.
CE?-C017.rk
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In both Wright and Porter the interviews were sought
with low-level employees, not regarding their own actions which
might be imputed to the corporation, but regarding incidents
which they witnessed while working for the organization.
cases

did

not

involve

management-level

employees

who

These
are

questioned regarding their actions or the actions and decisions
of other executives taken in behalf of the corporation.

The

Porter case properly took the differences between its facts,
Wright, and this case into account by acknowledging that contact
with

former management

employees

is governed

by a different

standard from that applied to low-level employees.

In Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp.. 116 F.R.D. 36 (D.
Mass 1987), the court refused to issue a protective order or
impose sanctions against
counsel for conducting an ex parte
interview with a former corporate president. In arriving at this
conclusion, however, the court stated that "[i]t is undisputed
that Shapiro [the former officer] left the employ of the
defendant prior to the contract dispute that forms the basis for
the litigation." Id. at 40. The court concluded that there was
"no evidence that Shapiro's acts or omissions could be imputed to
[the corporation] for purposes of its civil liability." Id. The
court cited Soerber and distinguished it on the grounds that "the
acts of the former employees [in Soerber] were the subject of the
litigation." Amarin, 116 F.R.D. at 40. Our case, like Sperber,
involves former management employees who were employed by the
corporation and involved in decisions during the time when many
of the contracts and disputes arose in this case. Unlike the
situation in Amarin, there is a real threat in this case that the
opposing party will attempt to impute to the corporation the
actions or omissions of the former employees which it has
contacted ex parte.
CET-G017<rk
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Ill,

EX PARTE CONTACT WITH FORMER MANAGEMENT-LEVEL
EMPLOYEES MUST BE PROHIBITED TO PROTECT
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Contact with certain

former employees must also be

prohibited

in order to protect the corporation's interest in

preventing

disclosure

communications.

of

its

own

Communications

privileged

between

an

attorney-client

attorney

and his

client are protected under Utah R. Evid. 501 and Utah Code Ann. §
78-24-8(2).

When management personnel, as representatives of the

corporation, consult with counsel, any privileged communications
inure to the benefit of the corporation.
as a necessary party

The corporate employee,

to the communication,

divulge the contents of the communication.

has no right to
Under Utah law,

whenever a third person's presence "is reasonably necessary under
the circumstances," the party protected by the privilege can
prevent

the

third

communications.
1985).

person

from

disclosing

the

confidential

Hofmann v. Conder, 712 P.2d 216, 216-17 (Utah

Accordingly, a former managerial employee, even though no

longer an employee, is not entitled to disclose confidential
attorney-client communications of the corporation.8
8

See, e.g..

Some courts have stated that communications between
corporate counsel and a former management employee which occur
after the employment relationship has ended Bay still be
protected attorney-client communications.
See, e.g., Command
Transp.. Inc. v. Y.S. Line fUSAl Corp.. 116 F.R.D. 94, 95-97 (D.
Mass. 1987); Porter v. Arco Metals Co.. 642 F. Supp. 1116, 111718 (D. Mont. 1986).
CET-C017.rk
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Long

Beach v. Standard Oil Co.

(In re Coordinated

Pretrial

P r o c ) . 658 F,2d 1355, 1361 n«7 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied,
455 U.S. 990 (1982) (*the attorney-client privilege is served by
the certainty that conversations between attorney and client will
remain privileged after the employee leaves*)•
Any

ex parte

communications

with persons privy to

corporate attorney-client communications deprives the corporation
of the right to protect its privilege.

In the absence of Getty's

counsel, protection of the corporation's privilege is in the
hands of the former employee.

The employee may be unaware of

which communications were privileged or may be otherwise unable
or unwilling to adequately protect the confidence.

Either way,

the corporation's interests may be jeopardized without providing
the corporation an opportunity to protect its privilege.
remedies

available

once

privileged

communications

have

The
been

released are either inadequate for the corporation or drastic for
the opposing party.
the opportunity
employees

Requiring that corporate counsel be given

to attend

provides

the

interviews with

simpler,

problem.

GET-C017.rk
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more

just

former management
solution

to

the

IV,

ANY INFORMATION GAINED THROUGH IMPROPER EX PARTE
CONTACT IS INADMISSIBLE AND SHOULD NOT BE

VgSP FOR ANY PVRPQSE
Even when ex parte contact with lover level employees
is permitted, courts have restricted the admissibility of any
evidence obtained through the contact.

In Allen Steel Co, v,

Deseret Title Holding Corp., No. C-80-9512 (Utah Dist. Ct. May 4,
1984) (attached as Exhibit "F"), presiding Judge Scott Daniels
allowed the plaintiffs' attorneys to interview specified former
lower level supervisory employees of a defendant.

They included

"assistant project managers, assistant project superintendents,
supervisors and foremen."
court

allowed

the

Id. . slip. op. at 2.

interviews

to

occur,

it

Although the

restricted

the

admissibility of any evidence obtained in the interviews:
[Plaintiffs] may interview past employees of
[defendants] who served in the above categories.
Any statements received# however, from such
employees, either oral or in writing, past or
prospective, will be excluded from use at the
trial either as evidence or for the purpose of
impeaching any witness.
Furthermore, any
statements, oral or in writing, obtained from
such employees will not be considered binding
upon [defendant]; will not be imputed to said
company and will not be treated as an admission
of said company.
Jfl.

h fortiori, any statements obtained through the ex parte

contact in this case should be excluded from use at trial and
from any other use in this proceeding.

Where low-level employees

are involved, there is not the danger that their actions will be
CET-G017.rk
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imputed

to

the

confidential

corporation

or

attorney-client

management-level
admissibility,

employees
alone,

corporation's interest.

they

will

communications.

are

are

that

involved,

insufficient

disclose

Thus,

where

restrictions
to

protect

on
the

Any evidence, information, or statements

obtained through the ex parte contact of Gold Standard's counsel
with Getty's former employees should be ruled inadmissible for
any purpose at trial.

V.

OPPOSING COUNSEL SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO DISCLOSE THE
CONTENTS OF AND SURRENDER THE DOCUMENTS OBTAINED
THROUGH CONTACTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED
Getty cannot adequately ascertain the injury which it

has sustained through the improper ex parte contact unless it has
access to the information and materials acquired through the
contacts,

including

notes

of

any

person

present,

documents

produced from the former employees, and any recorded or written
statement given by such individuals.

Furthermore, since the

contacts were improper, the plaintiff should not be allowed to
benefit

from

the

information

or

retain

any

documents

that

memorialize or were received through the contacts.
Gold Standard and its counsel should be required to
provide Getty with all information and material obtained through
the

ex

CET-C017.rk
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contact.

Allowing
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ex

parte

interviews

but

prohibiting

the

admission

of

any

evidence

obtained

in the

Interviews may have been sufficient in Judge Daniel's ruling in
Allen Steel to prevent prejudice to the defendant, but that
remedy is not sufficient here.
of

only

lower

level

Allen Steel involved interviews

supervisory

personnel.

The

specifically limited its ruling to those employees.

court

In this

case, the opposing counsel has contacted former executives and
key members of Getty's management.

These former employees were

privy to information that is protected against disclosure under
the attorney-client

privilege and their actions or omissions

regarding the substance of the complaint against the defendants
will

almost

certainly

be

sought

to

be

imputed

to

Getty.

Consequently, the interviews themselves are potentially unfairly
injurious

to Getty.

A

restriction on the admissibility

of

evidence will not alone properly protect Getty's interest in
preventing

nondisclosure

attorney-client privilege.

of

information

protected

by

the

Further ex parte contact must be

prohibited and the substance and extent of contact which has
already occurred must be examined to determine whether additional
sanctions, such as disqualification, may be justified.

CET-C017 rk
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VI.
Good

CONCLUSION

cause has been shown.

The ex parte contact

between Gold Standard's attorneys and Getty's former executive
and key management employees is improper, and is in violation of
the

provisions

of

both

Professional Conduct.
right

to

protect

attorneys.

its

the

current

and

court

of

confidential

communications

with

its

Gold Standard is now in possession of information

issues,

information

Rules

The ex parte contact endangers Getty's

improperly obtained through ex parte contact.
the

Proposed

further

improperly

prejudice of Getty.

improper

Unless an order of

contacts

may

obtained may be unfairly

occur

and

used to the

The proposed Order should be entered.

DATED this *J '

day of November, 1987.
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS

Stephen G. Crockett, Esq.
Attorneys for Getty Oil Company and
Getty Mining Company

CET-C017.rk
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the^^

w

day of November, 1987, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing "Memorandum in Support of
Petition for Order to Show Cause" was hand-delivered to the
following:
James S. Lowrie, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gordon L. Roberts. Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street
Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert M. McDonald, Esq.
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

^khj.s^ 0 ^ / 7 y /»''-
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1 I /"/'. / / * .
2

P R O C E E D I N G S
SCOTT L.

I

SMITH.

by

/-N

J

/

L^

/

CALLED AS A WITNESS 8Y AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS.
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN. WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS
FOLLOWS:
MR. MCDONALD:

BEFORE WE BEGIN, I WOULD LIKE TO

MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST ON THE RECORD.
8

MY INVOLVEMENT IN THIS

| AS ATTORNEY FOR MR. SMITH INVOLVES A VERY LIMITED ISSUE, AND
I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A REQUEST THAT YOU BEGIN INQUIRY ON THE

10 j ALTER EGO ISSUES AND ADVISE ME WHEN YOU ARE DONE SO THAT I
11
12 j

CAN MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER TO CONTINUE.
MR. ROBERTS:

I AM NOT PREPARED TO DO THAT.

I CAN

TELL YOU, FOR WHATEVER GOOD IT MAY QE. THAT IT IS NOT WI T HIN
1C j MY PLANS FOR TODAY'S QUESTIONING TO FOCUS ON THAT ISSUE,
15

ALTHOUGH IT MAY WELL BE THAT SOME BITS OF EVIDENCE THAT COME

16

OUT TODAY MIGHT APPLY TO THAT ISSUE. BUT IT IS NOT MY INTENT

17

TO DO TODAY FOCUSED EXAMINATION ON THAT PARTICULAR SUBJECT.

18

IF THAT'S OF ANY HELP TO YOU, SOB.

19

MR. MCDONALD:

20

IT THEN YOU ARE DENYING MY REQUEST?

21

MR. ROBERTS:

WELL, THAT'S A LITTLE HELP.

I AM SIMPLY NOT PREPARED.

I TAKE

I

22 J PREPARED MY DEPOSITION ANOTHER WAY, AND I AM NOT PREPARED TO
23

DO IT THAT K . W .

C

2C

THAT j AM NOT PREPARED TO DO IT THAT WAY, BUT I HAVE GIVE\!

25

YOJ AN INDICATION OF WHAT I AM PREPARED TQ Q Q TODA** « AND I"

0

JT'5

N0T

A

MATTER OF PEAK: IT'S A MATTER

1

0

HAVE YOU SUBSEQUENTLY, SINCE THIS LAWSUIT GOT

2

STARTED OR IN PREPARATION FOR FILING OF THIS LAWSUIT. HAVE

3

YOU EVER TALKED ABOUT HAUTALA ABOUT THIS LETTER- WHICH WAS

4 I ATTACHED TO EXHIBIT 97 ?

5 I

A

6

0

WHEN WAS THAT?

7

A

TWO OR THREE WEEKS AGO, A MONTH AGO.

8

0

HE WAS DOWN HERE IN SALT LAKE CITY, WAS HE?

9

A

YES.

10

0

ASSISTING YOU IN DOING SOME WORK ON THIS

11

LITIGATION?

12

A

NO .

13

0

WHAT WAS HE DOING DOWN HERE?

14

A

HE WAS ASKED TO COME DOWN TO SEE IF HE COULD

15

YES.

RECOLLECT ANYTHING.

16

0

HE MET WITH YOU AND MR. LOWRIE?

17

A

UH-HUH (AFFIRMATIVE).

IS

THE SAME AS HE MET WITH

YOU, HE SAID.

19

O

I'M NOT CRITICIZING IT?

20 J

A

NO, BUT I MEAN, HE MADE A VERY BIG POINT THAT I AM

21 J NOT TAKING SIDES, AND BOB AND I HAVE HAD OUR DIFFERENCES, AND
22
23

I FELT THAT THAT WAS GOOD OF HIM TO SAY THAT.
O

WHO WAS IN THE MEETING WITH MR. HAUTALA TrAT WE

24

ARE NOW TAL-IING ABOUT WHERE THIS LETTER THAT IS ATTACHED TO

25

EXHIBIT 97 WAS DISCUSSED?

A

WELL, PEOPLE WERE COMING IN AND OUT OF THE ROOM,

AND SPECIFICALLY THIS THINS. IT WAS NOT DISCUSSED VERY MUCH.
I MEAN, THAT WAS JUST, I THINK, IT WAS ASKED. IF I REMEMBER
RIGHT, BY GYM, DO YOU REMEMBER THIS LETTER. AND I THINK HE
SAID YES. AND IT WENT ONTO OTHER SUBJECTS.

IT WASN'T A BIG

DEAL.
O

HE SAID, YES, HE SPECIFICALLY REMEMBERED THIS

LETTER?
A

I BELIEVE HE DID. YES.

I MEAN, I WASN'T PAYING

THAT MUCH ATTENTION TO THAT, BUT TO ME, THAT WAS NOT
IMPORTANT.
0

YOU DON'T THINK A LETTER IS IMPORTANT?

A

IT'S JUST REITERATING EVERYTHING THAT WENT ON ON

AND ON AND ON.

IT'S ALL THE WAY UP TO SEPTEMBER OF '£3, THE

SAME TYPE OF LETTER.

IT'S NOT MUCH DIFFERENT, I IMAGINE FROM

THIS AP.-.IL LETTER THAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT.

WE DIDN'T GO

THROUGH ALL THE DOCUMENTS, AT LEAST I DIDN'T WITH
O

HA'JTALA.

WELL, WHO ASKED HIM. DID YOU OR MR. LOWRIE ASK HIM

WHETHER HE RECALLED SEEING THIS LETTER?
A

HE WAS GOING THROUGH THE PAGES AND PAGES OF THIS

JUNK. AND IT WAS ONE OF THEM THAT HE HAD REMEMBERED SEEING,
WAS NO BIG DEAL.
O

-E JUST VOLUNTEERED THAT?

A

WELL, YES. DO YOU REMEM3EF THIS ONE, DO /0

REMEMBER THIS ONE. 00 YOU REMEMBER THAT ONE.

I DON% ~ -.NOW

A60UT THIS ONE. YES. THAT ONE IS ONE THAT HE WENT THROUGH
THAT HE HAD SEEN.
O

HOW MANY DOCUMENTS DID YOU GO THROUGH WITH HIM?

A

OH, MAYBE THIRTY OR FORTY.

O

AND HE UNEQUIVOCALLY TOLD YOU HE HAD SEEN THIS

DOCUMENT BEFORE?

8|

A

I'M SURE HE DID.

O

I AM TRYING TO PUT MYSELF A LITTLE BIT IN YOUR

THINKING, WHEN YOU SAY YOU DECIDED NOT TO TAKE THIS LETTER TO
10 j THE MEETING ON FEBRUARY 5TH. I THINK YOU SAID BUT IT WOULD BE
11

DISRUPTIVE, I HOPE I'M NOT MYSELF QUOTE GO YOU; IS THAT THE

12

WORDS YOU USED?

13

A

14
15
16

THAT IS CORRECT, BUT EVERY TIME THIS SUBJECT
MR. LOWRIE:

Q

WHY IS ANSWER THE QUESTION

(BY MR. ROBERTS)

DID YOU ALWAYS THINK IT WOULD BE

DISRUPTIVE TO MAIL THE LETTER?

17

A

NO.

18

Q

I DON'T UNDERSTAND THAT.

19

CAN YOU EXPLAIN TO THAT

TO ME, WHY WOULD IT BE DISRUPTIVE TO GIVE IT TO THEM

20

MR. MCDONALD:

DISRUPTIVE OF THE MEETING?

21

O

(BY MR. ROBERTS)

22 I

A

OF THE MEETING.

WHATEVER.
I JUST WANTED A LETTER IN WRITING

23 I OF WHAT WE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING ALL THIS TIME BEFORE THEY WENT
TO THEIR MEETING IN LOS ANGELES.
25 I

O

MY POINT IS. DO YOU THINK. THE LETTER IS ANY LESS

LAW or nets
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December 22, 1986

Robert S. McConnell, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick
Resources, et. al.

Dear Bob:
We have been contacted by Mike Beck, a former
employee of Getty, who advised us that you have contacted him
regarding the above matter.
We are concerned that Mr. Beck may have been a party
to privileged communications and it is our clients1 position
that they wish to preserve and assert the privilege as appropriate. Mr. Beck has asked us to advise you that it is his
desire that all communications with him be in the context of
formal discovery proceedings so that we may be present to
assert the privilege wherever appropriate. If you would like
to depose Mr. Beck, we would be happy to arrange a mutually
convenient time for the deposition.

RD0N L. ROBERTS
GLR:khm
cc: Mike Beck
bec: Stephen Dattels
Ken Hanley
Frank Wicks
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February 11, 1987

James S. Lowrie, Esq.
Robert S. McConnell, Esq.
JONES# WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Gold Standard Inc. v. American Barrick, et al.

Dear Gentlemen:
This will confirm the telephone conversation that
Fran Wikstrom and I had with Bob yesterday concerning your
attempts to interview Bob Blanc and Joe Berg. Messrs. Blanc
and Berg have contacted us and have requested us to advise you
that any attempts to contact them should be made through this
office.
Furthermore, Bob agreed that you will not attempt to
contact any former Getty employees without first notifying us
of your intention to do so, so that we may seek appropriate
relief in order to protect the attorney-client privilege.
Sincerely,

on L. Roberts
GLR:lmf
cc:

Robert P. Blanc
Joseph E. Berg, III
EXHIBIT "C"

J O N E S , WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUOH
A PftOrCSSlONAL COHPOAATION

AL0ft.»0Lft*00*
«N {..HAMPTON
D K i T WfNOHT
DONWWUftO*
ALD J.OCMCY

CLftAMOftCACHA*
ftANOALL
«.
-M«CT C O^AHAM
SIHAN W. STCrrCNSCN
• * * * t SAftCOCA

COMMASTt
ft*.
LSft. LOWfIC
1IY L. ClfTlrmi I
&TO*NC« I.. SUftTDN
.TCHOLMAN
.AM
ft.
ftONUNO

0«AN* JAftl*»#U
OCO»OC w. P*ATT
JAMCS W. »TCWA*T
*MJL ft*. MAflMAN
ftOCVOOCL
CVAN A.
ftCHNHJTZ

TUT ft. lUCQMMTl I.
4 A I L I L eCfHMTl
Gft.MA**OC*
AMO
ft\JO!Wtft
D ft. LfC«
cumrm*.

VIRGINIA ft. ftMlTH
OALC « . CMAMftCftLAIN
WANCY,|.ft*»ftMLUN
WILUAM C OtftftS
Dl*ON r. LAARIN
COWAWO i t MUNSON

Tm•.ANOC*SON

MoftcirrA.ooooMAN

(.'•?*. , J . ' ! , p f " \ !

ATTORNEYS A N D C O U N S E L O R S
ftftAMCMY

f : *,V

***

*****

CfTY

°rriCC

*

~ '*1ftO© riftftT INTt«*YATC * L A I A
• , , •f / « m * t C l l** /
L "^ * ° U ™ " * ' " * T " " T
• *»t#i«..^ t » «ftAi,T WA*t CtTY, UTAH ft«iOi
T * 4 . « * H O N C <ftO»
ftt»*toO
m „

- „ - _ _ - . m*mtMtm
RAwuMt, T N U M A M , W C 0 6 C » 0 0 0 • H i M
I U W U N I , HAT 4 I M H W I
H*ac«ACT»tM# • * * ft « * « * * *
lMOC»»rTftCft# • * * , • * « * • • • •
• CNWINMN
Z ? ! ! ^ * ^ ? ? ^ ^

»4 L AUOAO
ftCVCM
M. HOWC
IY A, STCCUt
MICMACL PATUlO* CftfttCN
kNNC WtST
OAVIO M. ftOMNCNKClCH
IftCTM M. HASLAM
JU4.IA L. WCftTON
«4N LCWIS
W M . ftCLLY NASH

COi'dltt I

ttf
«OT
• « •

• ImU

JL JL 1 % / O f
.

.J*.
£ 2

W A S H I N G T O N , p.C. o r r i c c
SUITE JftO
IOO(ttatTIICCT,N.W
WAftHlNGTON, O.C. * 0 0 3 7
TftUl#H 0 NC ( t O t ) t » * »»SO
* • « • « • A**.,**
P T . W O W W <ymct
© " * »0UTH MAIN STWCCT
• * • GCO«GC, UTAH A4770
T*uc*noNt ( t o o ft«s-»ft*7

r e o r u a r y xif

170/

——
IN MC»IY t g r i i i TO:

JOSCPM ft. JOMCS
HOOCH J . M«OOMOUGH
FRANK ANTHONY AU.CN
ALOCN ft. TUCCLCA
l T T * 0 AMO MCSIOCMT IN «
.tft?C*CO »AT»NY ATTOffMCV

HAND-DELIVERY
Mr. Gordon Roberts
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
185 South State Street, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Gold Standard v. American Barrick Resources Corp.,
et a h

Dear Gordy:
Bob McConnell has reported to me the substance of
your telephone conversation with him yesterday. Among
other things, he related that you have requested that we
give you notice if we intend to contact any ex-Getty employee
to inquire respecting the attorney-client relationship
with Pruitt, Gushee & Fletcher. I am writing to tell you
that I have no desire whatsoever to cause there to be any
breach of the attorney-client privilege between Getty and
Pruitt, Gushee 6 Fletcher. On the other hand, I do fully
intend to ascertain whether or not Pruitt, Gushee & Fletcher
was ever engaged to do anything or did anything adverse
to Gold Standard or Scott Smith while Dick Johns was employed
by that firm.
Toward that end, I do not intend to give you advance
notice any time I try to do any investigation in regard
to those matters. I don't think I am required to do that
under the rules and I don't think that you are entitled
to have such close control of our work product. Furthermore,
your client's former employees have done an adequate job
of protecting themselves. For example, Mr. Mike Beck,

Mr. Gordon Roberts
February 11, 1987
Page 2

when we called him, wouldn't tell us whether or not Pruitt,
Gushee ft Fletcher's fees were billed through to Gold Standard,
a fact which you have now readily admitted. Mr. Blanc
said he wouldn't talk to us at all until he talked with
you. Mr. Berd was abrasive and obnoxious about the whole
notion that I would presume to call him, even though he
called me back.
Please consider that I have taken your request under
consideration, discussed it with our work team over here,
and that we deny it. Our response to this may have been
somewhat different if your discovery responses hadn't been
couched to carefully refrain from telling us whether or
not Getty ever employed Pruit, Gushee ft Fletcher to render
any legal services adverse to Gold Standard while Dick
Johns was employed by Pruitt, Gushee & Fletcher. If your
responses had been forthright in that regard, it would
be unnecessary for us to engage in further investigation
at this time. The inadequacy of your responses will be
the subject of a separate letter.
I will shortly be scheduling the depositions of Berg
and Blanc. If you wish input as to the dates, you should
contact me at your early convenience.
Very truly yours,

James S. Lowrie
JSL/ac

Slip Opinion
of Professional Conduct.
At the tine of Sperber's discharge, Robert Uelsh was the Executive Director
of defendant and Edward Brent was the Administrator. Both were directly
involved in the decisions and actions taken to discharge Sperber. They both
subsequently left their positions with defendant, are currently employed
elseuhere, and are not parties to this suit. Neither is formally represented by
defendant's attorneys.
On June 27, 1963, plaintiff's attorney Eary Trachten deposed Robert Uelsh
after first giving notice to defendant's attorneys. An attorney for defendant
was present at and participated in the Uelsh deposition. On July 16, 1983,
defendant's attorney wrote to Trachten directing him to refrain from
communicating with defendant's present and former employees without the consent
of defendant's counsel, but Trachten replied that he considered It proper to
communicate with defendant's former employees.
On August 10 and 12, 1963, Trachten visited Uelsh unannounced at Uelsh's
ilace of employment and questioned him further without notice to or consent by
lefendant's attorneys. After his second encounter with Trachten, Uelsh notified
efendant's counsel and the following day at an August 16, 1963 pre-trial
onference defendant's attorney informed the court of Trachten's ex parte
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Slip Opinion
tnmunlcatlons with Uelsh. At that time, Trachten admitted to having
smunicated with Brent in a similar manner. That communication took place
netime in mid-August.

to

XI.
The District Court has not only the power but the duty to investigate claims
professional misconduct and to levy appropriate sanctions. Ceramco, Inc. v.
Pharmacuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit has
agnized the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional
)onslbllity as "providing appropriate guidelines for proper professional
ivlor," Cheng v. 6AF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1980).
he conduct complained of took place in mid-August, 1963. On August 2, 1983,
A.B.A. adopted a new set of Rules of professional Conduct which were
ctlve immediately. 51 U.S.L.u. 1 (Statute Section). The new Rules,
efore, rather than their predecessors contained in the American Bar
nation's Code of Professional Responsibility, are applicable to the motion
refore the court.
« defendant focuses its argument on the claim that Trachten's conduct
ted Rule 4.2, which provides in full:

to
t*

LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 1 CASE
#

JOEL SPERBER, Plaintiff, aoalnst WASHINGTON HE16HT5-UEST
HARLEM-INUOOD MENTAL HEALTH COUNCIL. INC.. COUNCIL'S HENTAL
HEALTH CENTER, Defendant^
NO. 82 CIV. 7428 CCBN)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Slip Opinion
November

21, 1982; VACATED AND WITHDRAWN

COUNSEL:
JAY J. 6URFEIN, P.C., 2 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10005, for plaintiff.
TEITELBAUM & HILLER, P.C., 1 U 0 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York
10036, for Gary Trachten.
EPSTEIN BECKER BORSODY t, GREEN, P.C., 250 Park Avenue, New York, New York
10D17, for defendant.

Slip Opinion
0P1N10NBY: MOTLEY
OPINION:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MOTLEY,. C.J.
I.
This Is an action in which the plaintiff alleges that he was discharged from
tils employment by defendant In violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and 42 U.S.C. S 1981. The defendant employer, Washington, Heights-west
Harlea-Inwood Mental Health Council, Inc., Council's Mental Health Center is a
non-profit community mental health center. The plaintiff, Joel Sperber, is a
white former employee who was terminated from his position as Coordinator of
Adolescent Services in July 1980. This action was filed in November 1962 and
the parties have been engaged In discovery. The defendant has now moved this
court for an order disqualifying the plaintiff's attorneys, Jay J. 6urfein and
»ary Trachten; revoking Trachten's pro hac vice admission; precluding the
introduction of certain evidence; and awarding costs including attorney's fees
to defendant on the motion. The basis of the motion is conduct by plaintiff's
ittorneys alleged to be in violation of the American Bar Association's Rules
EXHIBIT "E*
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Slip Opinion
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or
is authorized by law to do so.
51 U.S.L.W. 21. The meaning of the term "party" is clear when dealing with an
individual, but when the party formally represented by counsel Is an
organization, which can act only through its members or employees, the meaning
of "party" for the purposes of the Rule is not as easily resolved. The Rule
does not explicitly address Itself to the question. The old Rule, Disciplinary
Rule 7-104 of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional
Responsibility, was similarly silent on the meaning of the term "party" as
applied to organizations. n1
n1 The old rule, Disciplinary Rule 7-104 (A)(1) provided in full:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he Knows to be represented by a lawyer in that
matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other
party or is authorized by law to do so.

i
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This omission in the rules, however, was addressed by the A.8.A. in the
official Comment to new Rule 4.2. The Comment Identifies three categories of
individuals as parties for the purposes of the Rule's application to
organizations. It provides in part:
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications by a
lawyer for one party concerning the matter in representation with [13 persons
having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, and with any
other person C2I whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be
imputed to the organization for the purposes of civil or criminal liability or
(33 whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization.
51 U.S.L.W. 21 (bracketed numbers added).
The phrase preceding the second category o f the Comment, "any other person,"
ts plainly broad enough to cover certain former employees, and there Is nothing
explicitly Halting the Comment's application to current employees. Also, in
this case Welsh and Brent were the individuals who made and carried out the
decision to discharge Sperber. it is their actions and motives as officers of
the organization at the time which are the subject of plaintiff's claims of
discrimination and which plaintiff will seek to Impute to the defendant
organization in order to hold it civilly liable to plaintiff. It would appear,
therefore, that the conversations with Welsh and Brent fall under the

ft
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n

protection of Rule 4.2 as interpretated by the second category in the Comment.
Whether or not a statement by Welsh or Brent can be treated as an admission by
the organization for the purposes of rules of evidence or agency law is not
relevant to the inquiry here because those criteria are treated separately in
the third category of the Comment and are presented as distinct ind independent
of the criteria in the second category.
Prior bar association opinions cited by plaintiff are not necessarily
dispositive regarding the meaning of "party" for the purposes of the old Rule
7-104 because they did not have the benefit of an official Comment addressing
this specific issue such as that accompanying the new Rule.
Furthermore, while the various opinions presented to the court by plaintiffs
make general observations, at times in dicta, regarding the permissibility of
communications with former employees under the old rule, they make no distiction
between different types of former employees. In this case Welsh and Brent are
not merely witnesses to events and actions taken by the defendant organization
while they were employed there. They were in the highest management positions
of the organization as well as the primary actors for the organization with
respect to the conduct giving rise to this lawsuit. Even if their statements to
Trachten cannot be treated as admissions by the organization, their actions and
motives are, nevertheless, precisely those which plaintiff seeks to Impute to

W *
V*J
piS
— ^

0)

Slip Opinion
the organization. The fact that Welsh and Brent are now former employees does
mt alter this relation or connection with defendant or its potential civil
Liability based on their conduct as its highest officers. For similar reasons,
:hey are also unlike the kinds of "witnesses" whose Interviews with attorneys
tere given work product protection in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 395 (1947).
lee also J.B.M. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41-43 (2d Cir. 1975). This
ase also does not implicated the constitutional rights of criminal defendants
o prepare an adequate defense. Cf. I.B.n. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d at
3-44.
The continuing relation or connection between Welsh and the defendant is
ighllghted by the fact that although no longer an employee, not a party, and
3t represented by the defendant's attorney, Welsh was In communication with
ifendant during the course of this case, cooperated with defendant In the
rvelopment of its defense, was prepared and accompanied by defendant's attorney
: his deposition by Trachten, and will be testifying as a defense witness.
ent's status with respect to defendant is essentially the same. Brent
Omitted two affidavits in support of defendant's motion to disqualify and
ated that had he known that Trachten was an attorney and represented Sperber,
would have first notified defendant before speaking with him. n2

N
0)

0)
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n2 The circumstances of the communication with Brent are in dispute. The
defendant contends not only that Trachten failed to identify himself as a lawyer
who represented Sperber but that Trachten denied he was a lawyer when questioned
by Brent. Trachten denied these allegations. It was unnecessary for the court
to aake a determination with respect to this dispute.
In view of these considerations as well as the official Comment regarding
organizations as parties, Trachten*s ex parte communications with Welsh and
Brent were in violation of Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct despite
the fact that technically they were no longer current employees. Trachten's
conduct with respect to welsh is particularly problematic because of the fact
that prior to his ex parte communication with Welsh, he had already deposed him
for eight hours accompanied by defendant's counsel.
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III.
In Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980), the Supreme Court
acknowledged a court's "inherent power" to levy sanctions in response to abusive
litigation practices. 447 U.S. at 765, citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S.
626, 632 (1962).

5

Slip Opinion
An order of preclusion is a less severe sanction than is disqualification or
revocation of a pro hac vice admission,, both, of notch, the court considers
unwarranted and excessive In this case in view of the fact that discovery is
almost completed and the trial is Imminent.
Therefore, in order to prevent plaintiff's counsel from benefitting from
their misconduct in this matter, plaintiff will be barred from using on the
trial any of the statements taken from Welsh or Brent during their ex parte
interviews with plaintiff's attorney. Plaintiff will also be similarly barred
from utilizing during the trial of this case the fruits of those conversations.
The defendants will also be awarded costs and attorney's fees on this motion
upon the service and filing of a proper affidavit as to costs and fees. The
award of counsel fees and costs will, however, be stayed pending appeal.

0)

SO ORDERED
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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Defendants Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining Company
(hereafter collectively -Getty-) have petitioned this Court for
an order preventing Gold Standard's lawyers from interviewing
former -managerial- employees of Getty.

Getty's Petition also

seeks sanctions against Gold Standard, including the complete
destruction of plaintiffs work product which resulted from
these interviews.

For reasons described below, the Getty

Petition must be denied in its entirety.
First, discovery has proven, contrary to the
assertions in Getty's moving papers, that the interviews
conducted by plaintiff's lawyers with former Getty employees

1/ When Gold Standard filed its first Memorandum in
Opposition to the Getty Petition in November, 1987, it had not
yet had the opportunity to conduct necessary discovery to flesh
out factual questions raised by the Petition. At a hearing
held November 20, 1987, the court granted Gold Standard's
request to conduct limited discovery going to the issues raised
by the Petition. That discovery, depositions of former Getty
employees Charles J. Kundert and Robert L. Hautala, has now
been completed. The court need not refer to Gold Standard's
initial Memorandum, because this Substitute Memorandum
reiterates the matters discussed in the first memorandum, and
also incorporates pertinent portions of the testimony of
Kundert and Hautala.

thus far have not invaded Getty's attorney-client privilege,
nor threatened any other legitimate interest of Getty.
Second, while Getty's papers suggest that interviews
by plaintiffs lawyers with its former employees came as a
complete surprise to Getty last November, the depositions of
two such individuals, Charles Kundert and Robert Hautala,
demonstrate that Getty has known about these contacts since
early 1987, but failed to do anything about this situation
until November.
Third (putting aside the false representations Getty
has advanced in support of its Petition, and its acquiescence
for over nine months in the contacts with its former
employees), the law, as we will demonstrate, clearly permits
the lawyers for a party in litigation to interview the former
employees of an adverse corporation.
Thus, the sanctions sought by Getty are completely
unwarranted.

Any evidence obtained by plaintiff through its

contacts with former Getty employees was obtained properly and,
consequently, plaintiff is entitled to the full benefit of its
work product.
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ARGUMENT
I.

GETTY'S MOTION IS PREDICATED ON FALSE FACTUAL ASSERTIONS
Throughout its moving papers, the principal concern

articulated by Getty is that contact with its former employees
threatens its attorney-client privilege-

In its Memorandum In

Support of Petition for Order to Show Cause ("Getty
Memorandum"), Getty urges:
Unless the court, among other things,
prohibits further ex parte contact with
Getty's former management personnel, there
is a danger that such contact will continue
to occur and may unfairly prejudice Getty's
position in this litigation and its
attorney-client privilege.
Getty Memorandum, p. 4.

To demonstrate the imminence of this

-danger," Getty makes several false representations of fact
regarding alleged unethical encroachments by plaintiff's
counsel into Getty's attorney-client privilege.
The deposition testimony of two of the key former
Getty employees involved, Charles J. Kundert and Robert L.
Hautala (depositions which, back in November, Getty objected to
as "irrelevant-)2 has now revealed not only that Getty's

%S See Getty's Memorandum In Opposition to Gold
Standard's Motion to Continue Hearing and to Permit Limited
Discovery, p. 10.
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representations were false, but that Getty did little, if
anything, to investigate the factual basis for its Petition
before it was filed.

To begin with, Getty states that:

these individuals (referring to Hautala and
Kundert) were party to privileged
communications between the corporation and
its counsel.
Getty Memorandum, p. 4. (emphasis added).
Memorandum at 17.

See also Getty

Mr. Kundert testified unequivocally to the

contrary, however, that he was not a party to attorney-client
privileged communications relating to the Mercur project while
employed at Getty:
Q
(By Mr. Lowrie) I'm going to
rephrase the last question and ask you this,
Mr. Kundert. From the time of October, 1980
when the responsibility for the Mercur
project was transferred to Salt Lake City
and therefore out of your hands until the
time in the fall, was it, of '84 when you
took early retirement?
A (Witness nods)
Q Did you have any conversations with
any lawyers representing Getty with respect
to the Mercur project?
A

I don't think so.

Q
Prior to that time of October of
1980, did you have any conversations with
any lawyers with respect to the Mercur
project?

•4-

A
Frankly, I can't think of anything
specific. I am sure I probably talked to
Jack Sample (a Getty attorney) on occasion
but I don't remember anything that we
focused on. It may have been just general
terms.
Kundert Deposition, pp. 32-33.

Later, the witness clarified

that even prior to October, 1980, he could not recall any
conversations with lawyers regarding Mercur:
0
First of all, do I correctly
understand that you do not recall for sure
whether or not you discussed Mercur with
Jack Sample prior to October, 1980?
A
Id. at 34.

That's correct.

Moreover, Mr. Kundert testified that no one

representing Getty even bothered to ask whether he was a party
to attorney-client privileged communications:

Q
(By Mr. Lowrie) The question was
has anybody ever asked you in connection
with this litigation whether or not you hold
any attorney-client privileged information
from your prior employment, arising from
your prior employment with Getty?
A

No.

111. at 17.
In further support of its Petition, Getty has
suggested that Gold Standard's lawyers in fact have caused

-5-

Getty's former employees to divulge confidential
attorney-client communications.

In Getty's Memorandum In

Opposition to Gold Standard's Motion To Continue Hearing And To
Permit Limited Discovery (-Memorandum In Opposition-) on the
instant Petition, Getty asserts:

-Allowing further discovery

while Gold Standard is improperly in possession of evidence,
including privileged material, will exacerbate the injury which
has already occurred without assisting in the resolution of the
dispute.M

Getty's Memorandum In Opposition, p. 3.

reiterates at page 4:
is real and ongoing-

Getty

"The injury to Getty from these contacts
Privileged communications received

through the contacts may improperly be used as the foundation
3
for other discovery efforts."
(Emphasis added).
In fact, Getty's former employees have not disclosed
any privileged attorney-client communications to Gold
Standard's lawyers.

Three of the former employees discussed in

the Getty Petition, Robert Blanc, Joseph Berg, and Michael
Beck, simply declined Gold Standard's invitation to speak, and

3/ Gold Standard recognizes it is theoretically
possible to interpret these statements only to assert the
possibility that confidences have been breached, but believes
the assertions are carefully couched to suggest, erroneously,
that Gold Standard has already invaded Getty's attorney-client
privilege.
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Gold Standard's attorneys have since that time observed their
wishes.

See Affidavit of James S. Lowrie, Mf 3 and 4.
As to the two former employees that were contacted by

plaintiffs counsel, Robert Hautala and Charles Kundert, both
James S. Lowrie and George W. Pratt testified in their
Affidavits filed with the court in November, that
attorney-client communications were neither sought nor
received.
15.

Lowrie Affidavit, % 13; Pratt Affidavit 1[1f 6 and

This testimony was confirmed by Messrs. Kundert and

Hautala in their depositions, where they both testified that no
privileged information had been disclosed to plaintiffs
counsel.

Mr. Hautala testified as follows:
Q.
During the course of the Jones,
Waldo meetings did anyone ask you to
disclose conversations that you had had with
Mr. Joe Berg (the in-house Getty lawyer at
the Salt Lake City office) while you had
been employed at Salt Lake City?
A.
Not to my recollection, I don't
remember that question.
Q.
And to the best of your
recollection, during the course of the
Jones, Waldo meeting did you, in fact,
disclose the contents of any communications
you had with Mr. Berg while you were
employed at Salt Lake City?
A.
I don't think so.
remember any. . . .

Hautala Deposition, p. 43.
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I don't

Mr. Kundert, of course, said that he was not even
party to attorney-client communications regarding the Mercur
project, and therefore obviously could not have disclosed
them.

Mr. Kundert testified, moreover, that he was not asked

to reveal such communications:
Q.
During the course of that meeting,
did Mr. Pratt ask you to talk about any
conversations that you had had with lawyers
with respect to Gold Standard and the Mercur
project?
A.

Not that I recall.

Kundert Deposition at 39.
In short, by filing the instant Petition, Getty has
charged Gold Standard's lawyers with unethically invading
Getty's attorney-client privilege. After making this assertion,
it vigorously resisted Gold Standard's motion to conduct the
depositions of the former employees from whom these confidences
allegedly were extracted.

After the court granted Gold

Standard's motion to take these depositions, Messrs. Hautala
and Kundert testified, contrary to Getty's assertions, not only
that no attorney-client privileged communications had been
divulged, but that in Mr. Kundert's case, he was never a party
to privileged communications to begin with.
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The facts reveal

that any harm to Getty from the contacts, which it urges is
"real and ongoing," is a product only of Getty's imagination.
Getty's allegations of ethical violations, made
without any attempt to verify the facts, is offensive.

The

information which Getty has misrepresented was either known to
Getty or could have been learned easily, by inquiring of
Messrs. Kundert and Hautala.

Gold Standard believes that the

instant Petition, like the disqualification motion filed by
Getty at the outset of this litigation (which Getty
inexplicably withdrew several months after it had been filed
and argued to the court), has not been brought before the court
to redress any real injury, but instead has been utilized for
purely tactical purposes—to make it as difficult as possible
for Gold Standard to prepare its case for trial.

See Affidavit

of Scott L. Smith In Opposition to Getty Petition, %M 6 and 7.
II.

DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL
WRONGFULLY CONTACTED FORMER EMPLOYEES.
A.

Getty Has Known About Contacts Bv Plaintiffs
Lawyers With Its Former Employees Since
Egrly 1987.

Getty further asserts in its Petition, again falsely,
that it -was not informed o f plaintiffs contacts with former
employees, which allegedly took place "without notice" to
Getty.

Getty Memorandum, pp. 3 and 4.
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Getty suggests it was

completely unaware of any such contact until it was revealed
during the deposition of Gold Standard's President, Scott L.
Smith, on October 28, 1987. 13. at 3.
In fact, the depositions of Hautala and Kundert have
demonstrated that Getty knew about the contacts of plaintiff's
counsel with its former employees well before April 1987, but
acquiesced in the conduct until November, when it apparently
determined it could obtain some advantage by seeking to
prohibit this conduct.
Mr. Hautala, a former Production Manager in Getty's
Salt Lake City office, testified that in April 1987, he
attended a day-long information gathering meeting with lawyers
representing all the defendants, at the offices of Parsons,
Behle & Latimer.

Hautala Deposition, pp. 26-29.

He testified

further that well before this meeting he had received a phone
call from Fran Wikstrom, of Parsons, Behle & Latimer (which at
that time still represented Getty).

I£. at 32-35. At that

time he told Mr. Wikstrom that he had previously been contacted
by Gold Standard's lawyer, James Lowrie, with respect to the
disqualification motion that was then pending.

Hautala

Deposition, p. 35. Mr. Wikstrom replied that he would be
willing to prepare a letter to plaintiff's counsel instructing
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them not to speak to Mr. Hautala, but Mr. Hautala said that was
unnecessary:
Q. Moving back to the meeting at
Parsons, Behle & Latimer—did you have
something you wanted to say?
A. I don't want to talk out of context
here, but the question has come up about
whether somebody from Jones, Waldo had
talked to me prior to the meeting with
Parson. The reason I am fairly certain of
this is—is this okay? Can I bring this up?
Q.

You can say whatever you want.

A. The reason I am fairly certain of
this is because when I talked to the Parson
firm, I think this was Fran Wickstrom. At
that time I believe I must have told him
that I had a call from somebody from this
law firm (referring to Jones, Waldo) and he,
or whoever that attorney was, indicated that
other people had requested or that the law
firm had written letters to prevent your law
firm (referring to Jones, Waldo) from
contacting them or bothering them, and he
said that they would do that for me if I
wished. I said no, it doesn't make any
difference to me. I am neutral. I don't
know.
So that is why I believe that I know
that I had talked to somebody from both law
firms well before I went down to the Parson
meeting.
Hautala Deposition, pp. 31-32.

After they were specifically

advised of this contact, well before April 1987, neither Mr.
Wikstrom nor anyone else representing Getty took any steps to
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prevent any further contact between plaintiffs counsel and
Mr. Hautala.
Mr. Hautala further testified that, during his April
information-gathering meeting at the offices of Parsons, Behle
and Latimer, he reiterated that he had previously spoken to Mr.
4
Lowrie. Hautala Deposition, pp. 35-36.
Again, Getty did
nothing to prohibit the contacts with former Getty employees
that has now suddenly become such an urgent concern.
Not only did Getty fail to object to the contacts, but
in early 1987, when the contacts were brought to its attention,
its counsel expressly acknowledged plaintiff's intention to
speak to former employees that were willing to be interviewed.
Back in February, Gordon Roberts and James Lowrie exchanged
correspondence concerning this subject, and other matters.

In

a letter dated February 11, 1987, Mr. Lowrie advised
Mr, Roberts he did not believe Gold Standard's lawyers were
obliged to notify Mr. Roberts before contacting former
employees.

Mr. Roberts then acknowledged Mr. Lowrie's

4/ Mr. Hautala later expressed some doubt whether
he had first advised Getty of his contact with plaintiff's
counsel during his conversation with Mr. Wikstrom, or later at
the April 1987 meeting at Parsons, Behle, & Latimer. See
Hautala Deposition, p. 73.
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intention to speak with former Getty employees in his letter
dated February 13, 1987, which concludes:

M

So be it.-

See

Lowrie Affidavit, MM 5-10.
Later, in June, 1987, plaintiff's counsel also
interviewed, and obtained an affidavit from, Mr. Charles
Kundert, a former Manager of Mining Engineering for Getty.
That meeting, and the affidavit that was obtained, is discussed
in the Affidavit of George W. Pratt, at 1f1f 7-15, and in
Mr. Kunderfs deposition, at pp. 37-48.

During Mr. Kundert's

deposition, counsel for Getty stipulated that it had been aware
of this contact with Mr. Kundert as early as August, 1987. See
Kundert Deposition, p. 14, and letter from Robert S. Clark to
George W. Pratt, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.

Here again Getty did nothing to prevent this

conduct, which it now claims is unethical, until November.
B.

Getty Is Estopped To Prevent Plaintiff's Counsel
From Interviewing Former Employees.

Getty is estopped to prohibit the conduct it
acknowledged so many months ago.

The doctrine of equitable

estoppel prevents Getty from claiming ethical violations after
acquiescing in that conduct by its silence.

For example, in

Warpar Manufacturing Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 606 F. Supp.
852, 858 (N.D. Ohio 1984), where a party had been aware of dual
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representation by adverse counsel but waited two years to file
a motion for disqualification, the Court found the party
••estopped at this late date to raise the issue of
qualification.*

The Court found that "[d]uring that period

[when the party had been aware of the conflict], a substantial
amount of time was expended by attorneys. . . . The time
expended . . . amounts to detrimental reliance.M

id.

See also

Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985)
(••disqualification motions must be diligently pursued to avoid
waiver and may not be used as strategic litigation tactics-)
(citing Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir.
1975)).
Similarly, Gold Standard's counsel have taken valuable
time and effort to interview former Getty employees with the
full understanding that Getty's attorneys acknowledged this
practice and indicated a determination not to contest it.

They

should not now be heard to complain about this conduct.
III.

GOLD STANDARD HAS AN IMPORTANT. JUDICIALLY RECOGNIZED
INTEREST IN CONDUCTING INFORMAL DISCOVERY OF FORMER
GETTY EMPLOYEES
It is manifest that litigation can be conducted more

economically and expeditiously if counsel may informally
interview the individuals who have knowledge of the pertinent

-14-

facts.

In this case, there are former Getty employees who,

like Kundert and Hautala, are willing to be interviewed by Gold
Standard's lawyers, and who Gold Standard believes should be
interviewed in order to properly prepare its case for trial.
Without the opportunity to do so, the cost and time to litigate
this matter will be needlessly increased.

See Smith Affidavit,

IHf 6 and 7.
The courts have consistently recognized the important
interest a party has in conducting informal interviews of the
employees of an adverse corporate party.

According to one

court, the desired information "may be in the exclusive
possession of the corporation and may be too expensive or
impractical to collect through formal discovery.-

Frev v.

Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 106 F.R.D. 32, 37 (E.D.N.Y.
1985).

The result, according to the Frey court, may be to

-frustrate the right of an individual plaintiff with limited
resources to a fair trial and deter other litigants from
pursuing their legal remedies.-

Xfl. at 36.

See also Mompoint

v. Lotus Development Corp., 110 F.R.D. 414, 417 (D. Mass. 1986)
("courts have looked with considerable disfavor on attempts to
place limits on a lawyer#s ability to interview prospective
witnesses. . . .-)

In short, the right to prepare one*s case by
conducting interviews, even of the former employees of an
adverse corporate party, is an important one.
IV.

CONTACT WITH FORMER GETTY EMPLOYEES CANNOT BE PROHIBITED
UNDER ANY OF THE THEORIES ADVANCED BY GETTY.
Getty seeks to prevent and sanction plaintiffs access

to virtually all the important fact witnesses in this case on
the grounds that they are former Getty employees.

Getty

contends that this relief is justified because (1) the current
statements made by these employees may be binding on the
corporation; and (2) the contact may prompt some breach of the
attorney-client privilege.

As demonstrated below, these

concerns are totally unfounded.
A.

The Current Statements of Former Getty Employees
Cannot Possibly "Bind" Gettv As Admissions.

Former Rule DR 7-104(A)(1) of the Utah Code of
Professional Responsibility, and newly enacted Rule 4.2 of the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct (which became effective
January 1, 1988), are designed to prevent a lawyer from taking
unfair advantage of his adversary, by prohibiting the lawyer
from contacting the adverse party outside the presence of
opposing counsel.

In the case of an organization, the "party"

consists of those representatives that may prejudice the
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organization because they have authority to make statements
that may be binding, as admissions, against it:
In the case of an organization, this Rule
prohibits communications by a lawyer for one
party concerning the matter in
representation with persons having a
managerial responsibility on behalf of the
organization, and with any other person
whose act or omission in connection with
that matter may be imputed to the
organization for purposes of civil or
criminal liability or whose statement may
constitute an admission on the part of the
organization.
Official Comment to Rule 4.2.
The Comment expressly recognizes the right of counsel
to contact even the present employees of an adverse corporate
party, but in order to protect the corporate party against
unwitting statements of its employees, the Rule limits this
right in the case of employees that, due to their status, may
make admissions that become binding against the corporation.
In short, in the case of a corporation the Rule is designed -to
preclude the interviewing of those corporate employees who have
the authority to bind the corporation.-

Wright v. Group Health

Hospital, 691 P.2d 564, 519 (Wash. 1984) (emphasis in original).
Getty argues that the current statements of even
former Getty employees may constitute -admissions- that will be
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binding against Getty at trial.

As demonstrated below,

however, Getty's concern is totally unfounded, for the simple
reason that the statements of former corporate employees simply
cannot, as a matter of law, bind the corporation as
admissions.

The leading case treating this issue is Wright v.

Group Health Hospital, 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984).

In Wright,

the court rejected the claim that a former employee could make
admissions binding on the corporation, and correctly defined
the term -party- to include only employees who have -speaking
authority- for the corporation:
We hold that the best interpretation of
-party- in litigation involving corporations
is only those employees who have the legal
authority to -bind- the corporation in a
legal evidentiary sense (i.e., those
employees who have -speaking authority- for
the corporation).
Id. at 569.

Since former employees cannot bind the

corporation, the court concluded that Rule 7-104(A) does not
apply to them:
We hold current Group Health employees
should be considered -parties- for the
purposes of the disciplinary rule if, under
applicable Washington law, they have
managing authority sufficient to give them
the right to speak for, and bind, the
corporation. Since former employees cannot
possibly speak for the corporation, we hold
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that CPR PR 7-104(AHl) does not apply to
them.
Id. (emphasis added).

The court's decision to permit contact

with former employees is consistent with the purposes of the
Rule:
This interpretation is consistent with
the declared purpose of the rule to protect
represented parties from the dangers of
dealing with adverse counsel. (citation
omitted.) A flexible interpretation of
-parties-, moreover, advances the policy of
keeping the testimony of employee witnesses
freely accessible to both parties. See ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Op. 117 (1934). We find no reason to
distinguish between employees who in fact
witnessed an event and those whose act or
omission caused the event leading to the
action. It is not the purpose of the rule
to protect a corporate party from the
revelation of prejudicial facts. (citation
omitted.) Rather, the Rule's function is to
preclude the interviewing of those corporate
employees who have the authority to bind the
corporation. (emphasis in original.)
H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 201 (1953).
1£. (emphasis added).

See also Amarin Plastics, Inc. v.

Maryland Cap Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass. 1987).

Accord

Mompoint v. Lotus Development Corp., 110 F.R.D. 414, 417-18 (D.
Mass. 1986) (current employees whose statements would not,
under rules of evidence, be -admissions," are not -parties-);
Frev v. Department of Health and Human Services, 106 F.£.D. 32,
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36-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (current employees whose statements would
not be evidentiary admissions are not "parties" subject to DR
7-104).
Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of state bar
committees that have examined this question have likewise
permitted contact with former employees.

For example, the

Wisconsin State Bar has ruled that:
a lawyer may contact a former employee of an
opposing party to obtain material
information, even though the former employee
was a managing agent, where he has severed
all relationship with the corporation and is
therefore not in a position to commit the
corporation.
Wisconsin State Bar Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Opinion E-82-10,
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct, Ethics Opinions: 1980-1985
(ABA/BNA), P. 801:9107 (1985).

Likewise, the Ethics Committee

of the Colorado Bar Association has ruled:
After leaving the organization's employ, a
former employee cannot bind the organization
as a matter of law. A lawyer does not
violate DR 7-104(A)(1) by communicating
directly with the organizations former
employee about the substantive dispute
without the prior consent of the
organization's counsel.

_?n_

Colorado Bar Association Opinion 69, 3 Law. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA), pp. 281-82 (1987).5

True and correct

copies of the abstracts of the foregoing bar opinions, and
those cited in footnote 5, from the ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on
Professional Conduct, are attached hereto as Exhibit B.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, in the only
authority we are aware of in Utah dealing with this subject,
Judge Daniels, while prohibiting contact with certain classes
of present employees, expressly permitted counsel to interview
the former employees of the corporate adversary in connection
with its trial preparation.

Allen Steel Company v.

Okland-Fouloer Company, Civil No. C-80-9512 (Third District
Court Order of May 4, 1984), a copy of which is attached to the
Getty Memorandum.

Thus, the Allen case, cited by Getty in its

S/ See also Maryland State Bar Assoc. Comm. on
Ethics, Opinion #86-13, Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct, Ethics
Opinions: 1980-1985 (ABA/BNA) p. 801: 4364 (1985) ("A lawyer
may communicate with a former employee of an adverse corporate
party . . . . " ) ; Illinois State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Prof.
Resp., Opinion #85-12, (April 4, 1986), 2 Law Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) p. 191 (1986) ("Since former employees are no
longer in a position to act or speak on behalf of the
corporation, direct communication with these persons does not
deprive the corporation of legal counsel.-); but see West
Virginia State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Opinion #87-01 (Jan.
20, 1987), 3 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 25 (1987)
(authority contra, but no reasoning or explanation given).
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Memorandum, expressly supports the right to contact former
employees which Getty seeks to prohibit by its Petition.
After an individual has left the employ of a
corporation, he may well have knowledge of matters that later
become the subject of litigation and thus, like any citizen, a
potential fact witness.

As the foregoing authorities amply

demonstrate, however, Getty cannot be bound by the current
statements of its former employees, no matter what position
these employees once held, and there is therefore no reason why
those persons should not be interviewed like any other fact
witness.
B.

Nor Can the Statements of Former Employees Be
"Imputed" to Getty.

Apparently recognizing that former employees cannot,
by definition, utter admissions binding on a former corporate
employee, Getty next seizes on a vague and poorly worded
portion of the Official Comment to Rule 4.2, to support its
backup position that *[t]he acts or omissions of Getty's former
management employees will clearly be sought to be imputed to

&
Judge Daniels' Order imposes certain limitations
on the use that may be made at trial of statements made by
former employees, which plaintiff believes would not be
appropriate here. This issue is discussed below, at Part VI.
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Getty in this lawsuit.-

Getty Memorandum, p. 8.

Getty relies

on the following language of the Comment:
This Rule prohibits communications by a
lawyer for one party concerning the matter
in representation with persons . . . whose
act or omission in connection with that
matter may be imputed to the organization
for purposes of civil and criminal
liability. (emphasis added.)
Getty contends that this -imputed" language should be
interpreted to include any former employee who once had
authority to speak for the corporation and now has personal
knowledge relevant to a litigated matter involving the
corporation.

In Getty's view, the fact that a former employee

once possessed speaking authority means, contrary to common
sense, that his current statements can still be -imputed- to
his employer, within the meaning of the Rule.
This argument was squarely rejected in Amarin
Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland C U P Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass.
1987).

In Amarin, the corporate defendant sought sanctions,

and a protective order preventing plaintiffs counsel from
interviewing the defendant's former President, Mr. Shapiro.
support of its motion, the defendant made virtually the
identical argument Getty makes here:
Maryland Cup has simply stated in conclusory
fashion that -it is Shapiro's actions and
m _

In

motives as an officer of Sweetheart at the
relevant time which are in dispute and which
plaintiff will seek to impute to the
defendant organization.116 F.R.D. at 40. The court rejected, however, the argument
that the statement of this former employee, who had no
remaining relationship with the corporation, could be "imputed"
to the defendant:
[T]he defendant has presented no facts which
would demonstrate that Shapiro had an
ongoing agency or fiduciary relationship
with Maryland Cup, or that Shapiro's acts or
omissions could be imputed to Maryland Cup
for purposes of its civil liability. The
mere fact that Shapiro may be a prospective
witness, even a critical one, does not
trigger the prohibitions of PR 7-104(AHl).
Id. (emphasis added).
Like the Amarin court, this court should give the
-imputed" language of the Comment a plain reading, consistent
with the underlying purpose of the Rule.

The Rule is not

designed to completely prohibit counsel from talking to a
corporation's employees.

It is designed to keep an attorney

from overreaching the adversary by going directly to the
adverse lawyer's client.

It carries out this design by

applying the prohibition only to a specific class of employees
-those corporate employees who have the authority to bind the
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corporation,*

Wright, supra at 569-

As discussed above, only

a certain class of current employees, and never former
employees, may bind the corporation by their statements. The
Comment can hardly have been intended to discard this simple
conceptual distinction, by bringing within its reach any former
employee who may have personal knowledge of facts relevant to
litigation.
Significantly, the Comment is all phrased in the
present tense, and makes no reference to former employees.

If

the draftsmen had intended to include former employees, they
could have done so by clear, unequivocal language.

Instead, it

is evident, as at least one court has indicated, that the
"imputed* language was intended to more precisely identify
those current employees, in addition to "persons have
managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization," who
are in a position to bind or commit to the corporation.

See

Massa v. Eaton Corp., 109 F.R.D. 312, 314 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
Getty is correct in its assertion that plaintiff will
attempt to "impute" to Getty any favorable evidence it may
learn by interviewing former Getty employees.

But it will do

this only in the same way it would introduce the testimony of
anv fact witness, former employee or not, who has personal
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knowledge of Getty's conduct.

The former Getty employees are

now people who have knowledge of what Getty did.

Although they

can describe past conduct that may have been binding on Getty
when it occurred, they presently have no authority to bind
Getty.

Plaintiff will therefore be unable to "impute" their

statements or conduct to Getty in any greater or different
sense than it could impute the testimony of any fact witness to
Getty.
C.

Getty's Authorities Lack Value As Precedent.

Against the persuasive reasoning in Wright and Amarin,
Judge Daniels' decision in Allen Steel, and the opinions of the
bar committees of Colorado, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Maryland which all permit contacts with former employees - Getty can
cite only to three cases, each of which has questionable value
as precedent.
First, Getty relies upon Porter v. ARCO Metals Co.,
642 F.Supp 1116 (D. Mont. 1986) where# admittedly, the court
prohibited contacts with "former employees with managerial
responsibilities.-

Ifl. at 1118.

In reaching this conclusion,

the court fully endorsed the Wright court's central
proposition, that Hthe term 'party* . . . encompasses 'only
those employees who have the legal authority to 'bind* the
corporation is a legal evidentiary sense, i.e., these employees

-26-

who have speaking authority for the corporation.•" Ifi.
(emphasis added) (quoting

Wright, supra, at 569). The

conclusion the court then draws from this premise, that former
employees (who, as explained above, cannot possibly "bind" the
corporation) may not be contacted, almost appears to be a
mistake in reasoning, since it does not logically follow from
the court's main premise.

At best, the court*s reasoning is

confused and, we submit, hardly a compelling authority for
Getty's position.
In addition, Getty relies heavily on Sperber v.
Washington Heights-West Harlem - Inwood Mental Health Council,
Inc., Civ. No. 82-7428 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), vacated and withdrawn.
This opinion was withdrawn by the judge who authored it,
however, indicating that he has repudiated his own reasoning on
this issue, and therefore lacks real value as precedent.
Finally, Getty cites American Protection Ins. Co. v.
MGM Grand Hotel, No. CV-LV-82-86 (D. Nev. Mar. 13th 1986).
This case involved egregious overreaching by the offending
attorney, and is completely distinguishable on its facts. The
offending attorney in MGM was contacted by an individual who
was both a former vice-president and a current litigation
consultant for the hotel.

The consultant offered to sell his

knowledge of the hotel's litigation preparation for $1,000,000.
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The court found the attorney in violation of Canon 9,
which prohibits the -appearance of impropriety,- because he was
facilitating this employee's scheme to collect a -bonanza for
being disloyal to MGM."
pp. 89-90 (1986).
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The court did not base its decision on the

fact that the consultant was a former employee.

Instead, the

court focussed on the lawyer's apparent unconscionable efforts
to extract the adversary's litigation strategy from the
consultant.

Needless to say, these outrageous facts bear no

resemblance to those here and the case is of no help on the
issue before this court.
V.

THE HYPOTHETICAL RISK OF INVASION OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHOULD NOT BAR CONTACT
WITH FORMER GETTY EMPLOYEES.

Getty also claims that ex parte contact between Gold
Standard's lawyers and their former employees threatens its
attorney-client privilege, but offers only paranoid speculation
in support of this contention.

The facts before this court

demonstrate that Getty's fears are unfounded.
Both Gold Standard's counsel, James Lowrie and George
Pratt, have testified under oath that when Hautala and Kundert,
the two Getty employees discussed in its Petition, were
interviewed, that no privileged attorney-client communications
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were either sought or obtained.

Pratt Affidavit H 15; Lowrie

Affidavit M 13. These facts were corroborated by Hautala and
Kundert, who both testified that plaintiffs counsel had not
inquired regarding attorney-client communications, and that no
privileged attorney-client communications were divulged during
the course of their interviews.

Kundert Deposition, pp. 32-3,

34, 39; Hautala Deposition, p. 43.
This evidence plainly demonstrates that former Getty
employees can be interviewed without any risk of intrusion upon
Getty's attorney-client privilege.
Of course, there is always some risk that when an
attorney interviews a former employee (or anyone else, for that
matter), that attorney-client communications may be disclosed.
However, the cases recognize that this risk is insufficient to
justify a blanket prohibition against interviewing former
employees.

Instead, some showing that attorneys have

deliberately attempted to invade the attorney-client privilege
by interviewing former employees is required before any relief
will be granted.

For example, in Porter v. ARCO Metals Co.,

642 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Mont. 1986), the court rejected the
argument that the possible disclosure of attorney-client
communications constituted a basis to stop interviews of former
corporate employees:
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Plaintiff's counsel has interviewed former
employees of defendant as prospective
witnesses. This presents no question of
privilege unless counsel asks the employees
to divulge confidential communications.
Id. at 1118 (emphasis added),

gee also Amarin Plastics, Inc.

v. Maryland Cup Corporation. 116 F.R.D. 36, 42 (D. Mass. 1987)
(potential invasion of attorney-client privilege only a basis
for relief M[i]f [movant] can demonstrate. . . that Amarin's
counsel sought in any way to cause Shapiro to divulge
confidential attorney-client communications . . . . H ) ; Colorado
Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm. Opinion 69, supra ("The inquiring lawyer
may not, however, while communicating with the organizations
former employees, inquire into privileged attorney-client
communications.")
Getty significantly has cited no authority for its
proposition that the risk of invading the attorney-client
privilege may justify impairing a party's trial preparation
effort or encroaching, arguably, on the free speech rights of
former employees.
The Court should not place Getty's attorney-client
privilege on a pedestal, and bow to it in derogation of the
important interests of other parties.

Instead, a rule of

reason should be applied. \Getty must rely on the good judgment
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of its managers, both present and former, to recognize the
importance of attorney-client communications, and instruct them
accordingly.

At the same time, the Court can expect all

counsel practicing before it to closely observe its ethical
7
obligation not to pry into attorney-client matters.
Finally, the court can prevent the use of any attorney-client
communications at trial, which is the ultimate protection.
These safeguards are plainly sufficient to protect Getty's
interests, as the evidence before the court demonstrates.
VI.

GETTY'S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IS COMPLETELY WITHOUT
JUSTIFICATION.
Getty's Petition requests the court to impose a number

of far-reaching sanctions against Gold Standard.

As described

below, no sanctions are justified in this case.
First, Getty requests an order prohibiting plaintiff's
counsel from contacting former Getty employees.

For the

reasons described in Part IV above, the court should instead

2/ Plaintiff notes that the risk of an inadvertent
disclosure of privileged communications is actually much less
when former employees talk to plaintiff's lawyers than when
they talk to non-lawyers (which Getty does not seek to enjoin)
because a non-lawyer has no sensitivity to, or responsibility
to avoid, learning about privileged communications.
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order that plaintiffs counsel are permitted to interview
former Getty employees.
Second/ Getty requests the court to require plaintiff
to disgorge its entire work product generated through its prior
contacts with Getty's former employees:

it seeks

identification of all former Getty employees contacted to date,
production of all documents and statements received from former
Getty employees, and finally, all notes taken by plaintiffs
counsel in connection with those interviews.
Gold Standard submits that, since any work product
derived through interviews of former Getty employees was
obtained properly, there is no reason to treat this work
product differently than any other attorney work product.

Even

if the court were to rule to the contrary, however, Getty has
cited no legal authority whatsoever for its novel proposition
that plaintiff should relinquish to it everything it obtained
by talking to former employees.
Finally, the Petition requests the court to prohibit
the use of any statements that may have been obtained from
former employees at trial, or for any other purpose.

This

remedy has an obvious appeal to Getty, but it is wholly
inappropriate in this case.
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The only -statement- that has been obtained by
plaintiffs counsel through its contacts with former Getty
employees thus far, is an affidavit that was signed by
Q

Mr, Charles Kundert.

The Kundert Affidavit authenticates

and explains two internal Getty memoranda that had come to the
attention of plaintiff's counsel-

Mr. Kundert testified at his

deposition that he signed the affidavit of his own free will
(Kundert Deposition, pp. 40-1), and that the statements
contained in the affidavit were true and correct:
Q.

Did you believe the affidavit to fairly
and truly state the matters contained
therein when you signed it?

A.

Yes.

1£. at 42.

8

Mr. Kundert signed the Affidavit because he was
willing to have set forth in writing his memory of events that
pertain to this lawsuit, like anv witness who signs any
statement in connection with litigation.

He properly responded

to his duty, as a citizen, to assist litigation by providing

&S Mr. Kundert also signed a letter addressed to
Mr. John Wilson of Parsons, Behle and Latimer, that had been
prepared for his signature by plaintiffs counsel.
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his recollection of material facts.

Having reaffirmed the

truthfulness of his Affidavit during his deposition, in the
presence even of Getty's counsel, there is no reason for the
court to place any restriction on the future use of his
Affidavit.
The only authority cited by Getty to support its
request to prohibit the use of statements received from former
employees is Judge Daniels* decision in Allen Steel Co. v.
Okland - Fouloer Co., Civil No. C-80-9512 (Third District Court
Order dated May 4, 1984), where the court ruled that -any
statements received, however, from [former] employees, either
oral or in writing, past or prospective, will be excluded from
use at the trial either as evidence or for the purpose of
impeaching any witness.Unfortunately, Judge Daniels' Order gives no
explanation why this restriction was ordered.

It appears

entirely inconsistent with his ruling that former employees may
be interviewed, like any other independent fact witnesses.
Furthermore, our research reveals no authority anywhere else in
the law to so restrict the use of statements of former
employees.

Additionally, a preclusion order like that imposed

by Judge Daniels should not be issued without greater factual
sharpening, including knowledge of the content of the *
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statements affected, the context in which they would be used,
and the purpose for which they would be offered•

The Allen

Steel case simply was not ripe for the restrictions imposed by
Judge Daniels.

The interlocutory order imposed in that case

would, in all events, be subject to revision by the court
during the course of the case or at the time of trial as issues
were more precisely focused.
Gold Standard submits that the limitations imposed by
Judge Daniels were ill-considered, have never been imposed by
9
any other court, and should not be imposed in this case.
Instead, the court should permit plaintiff to make full use of
any materials it obtains through its contacts with former Getty
employees willing to speak to plaintiff, as it would with any
other fact witnesses in this case.

Evidentiary rulings should

await trial or properly framed motions in limine which are

&/ Judge Daniels was in the unenviable position of
interpreting new law in response to fairly undeveloped and
short-sighted memoranda of law, which have been reviewed by
plaintiff's counsel. The plaintiffs attempted to argue that no
employee, past or current, manager or lower level, could be
deemed a "party.H The defendant took an equally unreasonable
position, that the Comment to Rule 4.2 dictated that all
employees, past or current, are protected from contact under
the Rule. Judge Daniels did not have the benefit of any of the
recent, well-reasoned authorities discussed above, in making
his decision. We submit that, had these authorities been
before the court, Judge Daniels would not have imposed
restrictions on the use of statements made by former employees.
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sharpened by knowledge of the actual evidence sought to be
precluded.
Particularly here, where Getty has acquiesced for many
months in the contacts of which it now complains, it is hardly
in a position to request any of the draconian sanctions sought
in its Petition,

The fact of the matter is that plaintiffs

counsel have merely obtained, and seek to obtain in the future,
the facts, through informal discovery, from parties having
knowledge of those facts.

There is no basis for the

suppression of truth or any of the other sanctions sought by
Getty.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Getty Petition
should be denied in its entirety.

The court should order that

plaintiff is free to interview former Getty employees as part
of its discovery effort in this case, and may freely use any
statements/ affidavits, and other materials generated from
those interviews both before trial and at the trial of this
matter.
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DATED this

J>

day of February, 1988
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK/& McDtWOUGH

J?mes S. Low#ie
George W. Pratt
James W. Peters
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Gold Standard, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVILCE
I hereby cestily that os\ the
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1988, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of tne foregoing PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTITUTE MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO (3ETTY DEFENDANTS' PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE to:
Stephen G. Crockett
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Gordon L. Roberts
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Robert M. McDonald
MCDONALD & BULLEN
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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LAW OFFICES OF

KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS
A PROFESSIONAL COKFOHATION

SUITE 1300
185 SOUTH STATE STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 11019
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 4 7
TELEPHONE (SOD 5 3 2 - 7 8 4 0

ROBERT 8 . CLJLRK

February 9, 1988

HAND DELIVERED
George W. Pratt, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& MCDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
RE:

Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick
Resources Corp., et al

Dear George:
You have asked me to review the transcript of Charles Kundert's
deposition, taken in your office on December 2, 1987, to determine
whether a statement made on the record was correctly transcribed.
On page 14, lines 23-25, the transcript reads: "Counsel, we will
stipulate that as of that point in time you learned about the
meeting." (Emphasis added.)
This letter will confirm what I have told you orally, that the
statement actually made was: "Counsel, we will stipulate that as of
that point in time s*e learned about the meeting." (Emphasis added.)
We agree with you that the transcript should be corrected in that
respect.
Very truly yours,

y&&fU

£&^

Robert S. Clark
of
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS
RSC:rk
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lawyer a form of payment consisting of a mixture
of a fixed fee and a contingent fee. Tbe lawyer
would receive a monthly payment equal to SO
percent of bis usual hourly fee. In addition, if the
litigation succeeds and tbe client recovers tbe
stock and other property tbat is tbe subject of tbe
action, tbe lawyer will receive a $150,000 bonus,
plus half of any punitive damages tbe client may
recover. Tbe lawyer seeks an opinion on tbe
propriety of this arrangement, and of a contract
by which he would share one-third of tbe bonus
with his client's out-of-state counsel.
This committee concludes tbat tbe proposed
arrangement is not unreasonable per se under tbe
Nevcda Rules of Professional Conduct The committee is not a fact-finding body, however, and
cannot determine the ultimate reasonableness of
a particular fee, since the determination of reasonableness is a factual one and cannot be made
until the lawyer's representation has ended. Supreme Court Rule 155(1) sets forth a number of
factors to consider in deciding whether a fee
arrangement is reasonable, including such things
as the time, labor and skill required of the lawyer,
the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the likelihood that other employment would be precluded,
the amount involved and the results obtained, and
the type of fee. whether fixed or contingent.
Other factors not mentioned in tbe rule are the
sophistication of the client, the fact that tbe
arrangement was proposed by the client, and the
importance of the issues It should be noted that
in this case, the lawyer risks losing only 20
percent of his usual fee, which is much less than
the all-or-nothing risks inherent in conventional
contingent fee contracts Therefore, the reasonableness of the bonus and punitive damages
share, which in absolute terms amount to a high
percentage, would have to be measured against
the total amount at stake and the degree of
difficulty and risk involved in tbe case generally
and on the punitive damages aspect — matters
which are not addressed in the inquiry. Furthermore, Rule 158(10) prohibits a lawyer from acquiring through a contingent fee arrangement
such a substantial investment in tbe case tbat be
loses bis perspective.
In addition to being reasonable, tbe fee arrangement must be in writing and must be thoroughly explained to and understood and approved
by tbe client. Tbe client must understand bow
costs will be billed and that tbe mixed-fee nature
of tbe contract may result in tbe inability of tbe
lawyer to distinguish billable from nonbiliaWe
hours.
The plan to divide tbe bonus with out-of-state
counsel u not inherently unethical either. Under
Rule 155(5), if tbe one-third share that would be
paid to the other lawyer is not proportionate to
the services be performs, then both lawyers most
assume joint responsibility for the representation,
and the client, after full disclosure, must approve
the fee-sharing plan in writing The lawyer must
also guard against participation by out-of-state
counsel tbat would constitute the unauthorized
practice of law in Nevada.

(Netada State Bar
• a t Professional "
4;o/14/t7)
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Obligations to Third Persons
COMMUNICATION
WITH
PERSON
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL - EMPLOYEESLawyer may mot communicate with adverse organization's current employees who
have authority to bind organization on subject matter of representation unless lawyer
receives permission of organization's counsel; former employees may be interviewed,
kowever, without permission of counsel with
recard to all matters except communications
subject to attorney-client privilege.
Digest of Opinion: This committee is a wire of
a great concern by members of the bar about tbe
propriety of communicating with the employee or
former employees of an adverse party organization. DR /-104(A)(1) prohibit* a lawyer from
communicating on the subject of a representation
with a party who the l»wyer knows is represented
by counsel without the prior consent of opposing
counsel or unless tbe lawyer u authorized by law
to do so.
The protection of DR 7-104(A)(1) is not solely
dependent upon the organization being named in
litigation. The organization should be considered
a party anytime it has specifically retained counsel to represent its interest regarding the subject
of representation or has specifically referred the
matter to house counsel. Once it has been determined tbat an organization is a party under DR
7-104(A)(l), it should be determined which persons within that organization constitute the party,
and which individuals are bystander witnesses.
Employees who constitute the party are differentiated from those who are bystander witnesses
by their authority to commit the organization to a
position regarding tbe subject matter of tbe representation. If an employee is in a position to
commit an organization in a particular situation
because of his authority or because for some
other reason the law cloaks him with authority,
then he, as the alter ego of the organization, is a
party for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1) See also
tbe Comment to Model Rule 4.2.
The distinction between bystander and nonbystander witnesses does not apply to an organization's former employees. After leaving tbe organization's employ, a former employee cannot
bind tbe organization as a matter of law. A
lawyer does not violate DR 7-104(A)(l) by communicating directly with the organization's former employee about the substantive dispute without tbe prior consent of the organization's
counsel.
The inquiring lawyer may not, however, while
communicating with the organization's former
employees, inquire into privileged attorney-client
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communications Nor may the inquiring ltwyer
listen while the former employee attempts to
divulge privileged communication* voluntarily.
An> privilege existing between the former employee and the organization's counsel belongs to
the organization, and can be waived on!) by the
organization
(Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee,
Opinion 69 Ret.; 4/20/87)

THREATENING CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONOhio lawyer n a y , as required by state
statute and without violating DR 7-105's
proscription against threatening criminal
prosecution to gain advantage in civil case,
demand of prospective defendant payment
for damage to or theft of plaintifTs property
and inform defendant that if payment is
made defendant cannot be criminally
prosecuted.
Digest of Opinion. Ohio Rev Stat Code
2307 61 requires, as a condition of bringing a
civil action against any person wilfully damaging
the piamtifTs property, that the plaintiff serve a
30-da> prior notice on the prospective defendant
demanding payment in the amount specified, and
not if> the prospective defendant that if payment
is made or an agreement for payment is completed, the prospective defendant cannot be criminally prosecuted
EC 7-21 states that threatening to use the
criminal process to coerce action in a private civil
controversy is a subversion of the criminal process DR 7-105 provides that a "lawyer shall not

present, participate in presenting, or threaten to
present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.** The apparent conflict
of the Ohio statute and the ethics code presents a
question as to what is ethically proper for a
lawyer who represents a plaintiff.
ABA Informal Opinion 14S4 (1981) held that
the Model Code does not prohibit a law firm that
is pursuing civil remedies on behalf of clients
against persons who are also violating a criminal
statute from reporting the violations to the prosecutor. Opinion 1484 interprets DR 7-105 and
EC 7-21 to mean that the prohibited conduct
occurs only where the threat of criminal prosecution is made or criminal charges are brought to
gain an advantage in an essentiall) private civil
dispute.
Utah Opinion 71 held that the pivotal issue is
one of motivation. If lodging a criminal complaint
is accomplished or threatened by a lawyer with
the sole purpose of gaining an advantage in a
civil matter the action is impermissible, but if the
possibility of criminal sanctions is mentioned in a
notice because of legislative mandate, the purpose appears to be compliance with the law on
behalf of the client See also Georgia Opinion 26 .
If a lawyer acts pursuant to the requirements
of the statute b> sending the notice prescribed in
the statute, the motivation is apparent!) compliance with the statute and not sole!) to obtain an
advantage in a civil matter and therefore it is not
ethically improper for the lawyer to send such a
notice
(Ohio State Bar Association Com mi net oo Legal
Ethics and Professional Conduct, Informal Opinion 17-9; 7/16/87)

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
COMMUNICATION
WITH
PERSON
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL - CLIENT F U N D S - CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICEFact that opposing party no longer had
legal representation presents lawyer from
being disciplined under Oregon's DR 7104AX 1) for U s private contacts with that
party, even though party had had legal representation and lawyer thought she still did.
Digest of Opinion: The lawyer, who had held a
power of attorney for a client, was asked to return
all of the client's papers to her. However, he
retained the client's will. The client's guardian
and conservator requested the will be returned.
Two more letters were written to the lawyer, one
from Dressier, a member of the law firm representing the conservator, and one from Meyer, a

lawyer representing the client The lawyer wrote
direct I) to the conservator proposing a "final
settlement*' between them
The bar alleges that the lawyer, by writing to
the conservator, violated DR 7-104(A)(1), in that
he communicated with a person he kne* was
represented by a lawyer. The bar argued that the
lawyer had a duty to communicate with the
conservator only through Dressier, who bad represented the conservator in July 1984. The evidence showed, however, that Dressier did not
represent the conservator when the lawyer wrote
to her in March 1985. Since Dressier no longer
represented the conservator, the lawyer had no
duty to request Dressier'* permission before communicating with her. It is a fortuity, but the
lawyer did not violate DR 7-104(A)(1).
The lawyer, however, did violate former DR 9102(B)(4) by refusing to deliver the will and
former 9-102(B)(3) by failing to account to the
former client for $9,000.
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Obligations to Third Persons
COMMUNICATION
WITH
PERSON
R E P R E S E N T E D BY C O U N S E L - CORPORATE E M P L O Y E E S Lawyer representing opposing party in
dispute with corporation may contact former
employees of corporation, including former
members of corporation's control group, re*
garding subject matter of lawsuit without
consent of corporate attorney.
Digest of Opinion: An attorney asks whether
he may communicate with a former employee of
a corporate party defendant about matters arising
during the employee's tenure with the corporation
without the consent of the corporate defendant's
attorney. He also asks whether the propriety of
any communication would be affected by the
former employee's having been a member of the
corporate control group during the relevant time
period.
Rule 7-l04<a)(l) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not
"communicate or cause another to communicate
on the subject of the representation with a party
he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that
matter unless he has the prior consent of the
H
lawyer representing such other party
When
the adverse party is an entity, this prohibition is
complicated by the need to determine which employees or other agents of the entity should be
included within the scope of the protection afforded by the rule.
Most authorities have limited their scope of the
protection of a corporate party to those managerial or other employees whose actions and statements can bind or be imputed to the corporation.
This interpretation was recently adopted by the
Illinois Court of Appeals in Fair Automotive
Repair v. Cor-X Systems, 128 IIIApp3d 763. I
U w M i n Prof Conduct 600 (1984). There, the
court held that for purposes of the Rule 7104(a)(1) prohibition, a corporate party constitutes only "those top management persons who
had the responsibility of making final decisions
and those employees whose advisory roles to top
management are such that a decision would not
normally be made without those persons* advice
or opinion or whose opinions in fact form the
basis of any final decision."
This same reasoning would eicludc former employees from the scope of the rule's protection,
even if those employees were formerly part of the
corporate control group. Since former employees
are no looter in a position to act or speak on
behalf of the corporation, direct communication
with these persons does not deprive the corporation of legal counsel. However, this rule may
prohibit direct communication with a former employee if that person is individually represented
regarding the matter in question.
Direct communication with former control
group employees may result in eliciting information adverse to the corporation But this no more
deprives the corporation of the benefit of counsel

than does direct communication with any potential witness.
(Illinois State Bar Association Committee on Professional Responsibility. Opinion 85-12; 4/4/86}

Private Firm
DISSOLUTION — W I T H D R A W A L Attomeys involved in dissolution of or
withdrawal from law firm are required to
give adequate notice of change in employment status to clients, consistent with client's best interests and ethical rules concerning solicitation, and advise clients of their
right to continue with one of lawyers involved in firm's change or select new
attorney.
Digest of Opinion An attorney inquires as to
the ethical requirements and proscriptions relating to contacts with clients when a private law
firm dissolves or when some of the attorneys
withdraw. The attorney's professional obligation
to the clients and to his former firm members is
not expressly defined by the law or by the Rules
of Professional Conduct The rules in these circumstances act as a regulatory framework, and
their provisions dictate that the interests of the
clients must prevail over all competing
considerations.
Rule 2-111(A) requires attorneys to provide for
an orderly transition in the event of attorney
withdrawal or dissolution, and to protect the
clients* interests whenever there is a change in
the employment status that materially alters the
representation This rule provides that "a member of the State Bar shall not withdraw from
employment until he has taken steps to avoid
foreseeable prejudice to . . . his client, including
giving due notice . . . allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all
papers and property to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable law and
rules"
The rights and obligations of attorneys involved in the dissolution of, or withdrawal from, a
law firm are affected by rules governing attorney
advertising and solicitation Rule 2-101 prohibits
communications concerning the availability for
professional employment thai are false, deceptive,
or misleading. Nevertheless, the rule and the
authorities interpreting the rule in recent years
have permitted wide latitude to attorneys who
wish to communicate directly with existing or
ial clients for professional employment. See
v. State Bar, 39 Cal3d 609, I Law.Man
Prof.Conduct 948 (Cal 1985).
Similarly, attorneys are prohibited from communicating with clients in person, by telephone,
or through agents acting on their behalf, in an
attempt to influence the decision of the client
with respect to the choice of counsel. Rule 2101(B) and (C). Nevertheless, if the client directs
inquiries to any of the attorneys involved in the

€740-4OStySt/SCK.S0

No. 34

MARYLAND

Opinion 86-1 Advertising; Newsletters; NonclienU, lawyer's duty
toward; Solicitation. A lawyer may
mail an environmental law newsletter,
which mentions the name of the law
firm without an address, to nonclients
and may represent them if they voluntarily contact thefirmrequesting representation. The lawyer must abide by the
guidelines regarding direct mail advertising. A lawyer may not engage in
direct follow-up communications to nonclients concerning specific events. A
lawyer who writes for the purpose of
public education should refrain from
giving a general solution which may be
misconstrued as applicable to all similar
problems. Opinion 85-45; DRs 2-101, 2103; ECs 2-2,2-3.(8/19/85)
Opinion 86-2 Criminal representation; Former clients; Minors; Multiple representation; Relatives. A lawyer may not represent a party who is
charged with stealing property belonging to the parents of a minor whom the
lawyer previously represented. There is
an inherent conflict of interest in representing one client against another
client. Where the former client is a
minor, the lawyer probably had substantial contact with his parents. Therefore,
the lawyer cannot represent the new
potential client, even if all the parties
consent after full disclosure. Opinions
78-14, 78-30, DRs MQ5(AXC); Canon 9.
(11/13/85)

801:4363

Opinion 86-8 Attorney-client privilege; Automobile accident case; Confidentiality; Disclosure; Former
client A lawyer who knows the whereabouts of a former client may not disclose
that information to another lawyer who
has filed suit against the former client
in an automobile accident case and has
been unable to locate him. A lawyer
may not disclose a client confidence or
secret unless the client consents after
full disclosure, when permitted under
the Code, or when required by law or
court order. A lawyer may not disclose
the whereabouts of a former client
against whom bench warrants have
been issued. Opinion 854; DR 4-101;
ABA U141. (10/11/85)
Opinion 86-10 Collections; Corporations; Division of fees; Jurisdiction;
Legal services; Misrepresentation. A
lawyer may not participate in a legal
services plan where a percentage of the
fee is retained by the referring corporation. A lawyer or law firm may not
divide legal fees with a nonlawyer. Lawyers may provide services through a
referral program or prepared legal plan
at reduced fees. The lawyers, however,
may not misrepresent to the public any
information about their services. Lawyers who participate in a lawyer referral
program may agree to bill for the lawyers* service through the corporation
establishing the program and pay a fee
to the corporation for this collection
service. The lawyers and the corporation must carefully abide by the Code
regarding collection agencies. The corporation may only be paid for nonlegal
services and may not divide legal fees
with a participating lawyer. Opinions
77-54, 85*5; DRs 2-10KA), 2-103, 3102(A), 3-103, 5401, 5-103, 5-104, 5-107;
ABA 254.

Opinion 86-4 Attorneys* liens; Escrow accounts; Jurisdiction. A lawyer
may assert a retaining lien for payment
of his fee on funds that are derived from
the sale of a clients property and are
held in escrow. Whether a lien is legally
proper must be determined by the terms
of the contract with the client, and is a
Opinion 86-13 Communication with
legal issue beyond the scope of the adverse parties; Corporations; Noncommittee's jurisdiction. Opinions 77-7, clients, lawyer's duty toward. A law81-33,85*4. (undated)
yer may communicate with a former
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ETHICS OPINIONS

employee of an adverse corporate party
if the former employee is not represented by counsel. If a lawyer must directly
communicate with an unrepresented
person, the lawyer should not provide
advice, except he may advise him to
obtain a lawyer. Opinions 83-4, 83-81;
DR 7-104(AXl); EC 7-18. (8/30/85)
Opinion 86-14 Discipline; Harassment; Misconduct; Settlements. A
lawyer may not threaten to file a grievance complaint against an opposing lawyer in a legal action in order to coerce a
settlement. A lawyer must report unprivileged knowledge of ethics violations to
a tribunal. A lawyer may not threaten
to file a grievance to obtain an advantage in a civil suit or merely to harass
another party. In his representation of a
client, a lawyer may not knowingly
engage in illegal conduct. Grievance
complaints are designed to protect society. Misusing them undermines this
purpose and could drive a wedge between a lawyer and his client. Md. Code
art. 27, §561; DRs 1-102, M03(A), 7102(A), 7-105; EC 7-21. (11/14/85)

No. 34

is obvious that such action would merely
serve to harass or maliciously injure
another. Disciplinary proceedings are
intended to protect the public, not punish an individual. DRs 7-102(AXl), 7-105.
(10/14/85)
Opinion 86-20 Attorney-client privilege; Confidentiality, Disclosure;
Foreclosures. A lawyer who represented the mortgagor in a foreclosure may
not answer inquiries by the lender's
lawyer about whether he had knowledge
of certain facts or events concerning the
foreclosure, unless his client has waived
the attorney-client privilege. A lawyer
may not knowingly reveal a confidence
or secret of his client without his client's
consent after full disclosure. Here, a
statement by a lawyer of a lack of
communication by his client would be a
revelation of a secret or confidence. The
lawyer, however, may reveal the confidences if so ordered by a court. DR 4101.(12/10/85)

Opinion 86-15 Advice to client; Jurisdiction. Whether a lawyer should
have told his client to stop payment on
checks rendered in partial payment of
debt is a matter outside the committee's
jurisdiction. The committee will not
render an opinion on legal issues or on a
case pending in court, unless the court
requests it. (9/13/85)

Opinion 86-21 Divorce; Settlements;
Threat of criminal prosecution. A
lawyer may draw up a settlement agreement in which the parties to a divorce
agree not to press criminal charges
against each other so long as the criminal charges were not filed in order to
gain an advantage in the divorce. A
lawyer shall not present criminal
charges solely to obtain an advantage in
a civil matter. DRs M02(AX5), 7-105(A).
(9/19/85)

Opinion 86-16 Discipline; Harassment; Misconduct; Threat of criminal prosecution. A lawyer may not
offer to discontinue a grievance filed by
his client against the client's former
lawyer in exchange for the payment of
money allegedly due from the client's
former lawyer. If a lawyer has knowledge of the commission's finding of no
violation he may not send a threatening
letter. A lawyer shall not take actions
for his client when he knows or when it

Opinion 86-22 Advertising; Discipline; Fees; Misrepresentation; Solicitation; Television. A lawyer may not
advertise on television by stating *if you
win, you don't pay.*' Such an advertisement improperly includes a contingent
fee rate without mention of possible
court costs and expenses. The advertisement is likely to mislead and deceive the
public since it makes only a partial
disclosure of relevant facts. However,
merely because such advertisements

:*2M6
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(PeansyHania Bar Association Committee e* Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Fccaaal Opinion 15-120; received 1/29/S7)

Obligations to Third Persons
COMMUNICATION WITH PERSONS
R E P R E S E N T E D BY COUNSEL - CORPORATE E M P L O Y E E S Lawyer may interview, outside presence of
corporate opponent's counsel, corporation's
former or present nonmanagement employees as well as former management employees
who were not employed when incident giving
rise to lawsuit occurred.
Digest of Opinion. A lawyer inquires as to
whether he may communicate with the corporate
employees of an opponent without securing the
permission of opposing counsel. DR 7-10* provides in pan that a lawyer may not communicate
on the subject of the representation with a party
known to be represented by counsel unless he has
received the consent of that lawyer or is authorized to do so by law.
A lawyer is permitted to communicate with
employees of an adverse corporate defendant other than directors, officers, managing agents, and
rarsons designated under the West Virginia
ules of Civil Procedure to speak on behalf of the
corporation. Any other employee ethically may
be contacted. Similarly, all directors, officers,
and managing agents who were employed at the
time of the incident f iving rise to the lawsuit are
not subject to inquiry absent approval of the
corporate attorney or as otherwise authorized by
law. Other former employees or directors, officers, and managing agents from other time periods are subject to such inquiry.
ABA Informal Opinion 1410 (1978) provides
basic guidelines for determining whether an officer or employee should be considered a party for
the purpose of the rule.
fWest Virginia State Bar Committee an Legal
Ethics, Opinio* S741; 1/20/17)

Private Finn
WITHDRAWAL - S O U O T A T I O N Lawyer withdrawing from law t n » n*Mf
communicate by telephone or in person with
clients with whom he has had professional
relationship to Inform them that he b gftabBshlng new practice and that they have right
to choose between former firm and new firm
for legal representation.
Digest of Opinion: The general proscription
against solicitation does not preclude a withdrawing lawyer from informing clients of thf firm
whom he or she personally represented prior to

his or her separation from the firm Such direct
contact falls within the exception for persons with
whom the lawyer has had a prior professional
relationship. DR 2-104 and Model Rule 7.3.
It b clear that simple announcements of ne»
associations are appropriate. 1 ALR4th 11641165. In addition, ethics opinions from other
jurisdictions have approved of telephone or personal communications with clients, with whom
the lawyer has had a professional relationship, to
inform them of the lawyer's new practice and
their right to choose between the formerfirmand
the lawyer's new firm with respect to legal representation. See, e.g.. New York City Opinion 8065 (1980).
(Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Committer
Opinion E-3I7; 1/87)

Unauthorized Practice
AIDING UNAUTHORIZED
- LETTERHEAD-

PRACTICE

Lawyer retained by hospital to collect
past due accounts may distribute blank letterhead to hospital or its agent for purpose
of typing collection letter that lawyer writes,
reviews for accuracy, and personally signs.
Digest of Opinion: A corporation is engaged in
the business of assisting hospitals in managing
patient accounts receivable. It sends a series of
notices in the hospital's name to patients who
have not paid their bills. These notices become
increasingly forceful until the last one says that
the account will be turned over to a lawyer.
The lawyer then drifts a demand letter with
information provided by either the hospital or the
corporation. All the information is routine, such
as patient name and account number, except that
the time period within which to respond is stated,
the amount due is stated, and the hospital's telephone number is listed for questions. The lawyer
is asked to add any additional provisions required
by law. The draft letter is typed on the lawyer's
letterhead by the hospital, the corporation, a
typing service (not necessarily retained by the
lawyer), or by the lawyer.
When the letter is typed somewhere other than
in the lawyer's office, it is then delivered to the
lawyer. The letter is reviewed by the lawyer and
checked against hospital records to ensure that its
content is accurate and that no payment has yet
been received on the account or other disposition
has occurred. The letter is manuall) signed by the
lawyer and then mailed under the joint supervision of the hospital and the lawyer to ensure its
timely mailing and an accurate recording of the
recipient, the unpaid balance due. and the date
mailed.
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INTRODUCTION
Defendants Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining Company
("Getty") have petitioned the court for an Order to Show Cause
why

sanctions

Standard,

should

Inc.

contacts with

not

be

imposed

("Gold Standard")
former managerial

for

against plaintiff Gold
its

improper

ex parte

employees of Getty who were

involved in the decisions and actions forming the basis of Gold
Standard's allegations in this case.

Gold Standard should not be

permitted to benefit from these improper contacts and further ex
parte contacts with former Getty management personnel should be
prohibited, absent consent from Getty's counsel.
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit ex
parte contacts of an adversary's former management employees.
Under the unique circumstances of this case, the damage to Getty
from such contacts is particularly serious.

Getty no longer has

its own employees and no longer employs any of the management
personnel who were responsible for negotiating and overseeing the
Operating Agreement between Getty and Gold Standard which is the
subject of this litigation.
itself

in

this

lawsuit

Getty's ability to properly defend

is dependant upon

former management

employees' testimony regarding their actions while employed by
Getty.
Gold

Standard's

attorneys

have

contacted

and

interviewed several former management employees and have prepared
get-g009.pis

an affidavit for at least one former employee to sign.
Standard

also

has

identified

additional

former

Gold

management

employees which its attorneys will contact if permitted by the
court.

The protection against ex parte contact of a "party" by

an adversary's attorneys is meaningless if all of those who acted
in behalf of the party respecting the matter in dispute are
excluded from this protection.

In the corporate context, the

definition of a "party" must be broad enough to protect the
corporation

against

contacts

with

those

who

effectively

constitute the party with respect to a particular matter in
dispute.

Under the unique circumstances of this case, allowing

unrestrained ex parte contacts with former Getty employees is
equivalent to allowing unrestrained contact of all of a typical
corporation's current and former employees.
Getty attempted to remedy the situation without
resort

to

contacts

the
with

attorneys.

court

by

former

consistently
Getty

objecting

employees

by

to ex parte

Gold

Standard's

Upon learning of the full extent and on-going nature

of the ex parte contacts, including the October, 1987 meetings
with Hautala, Getty promptly filed this Petition seeking a court
order to remedy past injury and prevent future improper contacts.
ADDITIONAL FACTS
Subsequent
"Memorandum

to

the

filing

of

Getty's

initial

in Support of its Petition for An Order to Show

Cause" (hereinafter "Getty's Initial Memorandum"), Gold Standard

has deposed former Getty employees, Robert Hautala and Charles
Kundert, and has submitted affidavits opposing Getty's Petition.
The following additional facts not set forth in Getty's Initial
Memorandum are relevant.
Both
depositions
managerial
project.

Hautala

that

they

and

Kundert

occupied

responsibility

testified

positions

at Getty

in

their

of

significant

in overseeing

the Mercur

Hautala served as Production Manager for Getty Oil's

United States Mineral District and was responsible for all United
States projects, including the Mercur project.
Robert

L.

Hautala

(hereafter

December 3, 1987, at 11.
Engineering

Manager

"Hautala

Deposition of

Deposition"),

dated

Charles J. Kundert was the Minerals

responsible

functions of the mining group.

for

all

of

the

engineering

Deposition of Charles J. Kundert

(hereafter "Kundert Deposition"), dated December 2, 1987, at 79.
Hautala and Kundert both testified that they had
contacts with Getty attorneys while employed by Getty.
attorney-client
testified

he

communications
is

presently

were

unable

so
to

pervasive
distinguish

Hautala's
that

he

between

information he obtained from Getty's attorneys and information he
obtained from others.

Hautala Deposition at 66*68.

Indeed,

Hautala had almost daily contact with Getty's attorneys, usually
for the purpose of seeking legal advice.

Id. at 18-22.

Kundert

testified that he also had contact with Getty attorneys, in a

context suggesting that he also was privy to attorney-client
communications, although he could not recall specific information
that would be privileged.

Kundert Deposition at 28*29, 34-35.1

Scott Smith, Gold Standard's president, submitted an
affidavit in which he testified that he has spoken with other
former Getty employees, including Charles Trimble and Cecil H.
Smith, who he claims are willing to meet privately with Gold
Standard's attorneys.
"Smith Affidavit"),

Affidavit of Scott L. Smith (hereafter

% 6.

Getty believes that each of these

individuals was party to numerous attorney client communications
and played central roles in the Mercur project.2

Moreover, Mr.

Smith further testified that "[t]here are numerous other former
Getty employees that [he] would like Gold Standard's attorneys to
contact [regarding matters connected to this lawsuit]."
Affidavit, % 6.

Smith

Thus, not only have improper contacts already

occurred, but additional contacts will occur absent a court order
prohibiting the same.

1

Copies of the relevant sections of the
transcripts of Hautala and Kundert are attached
Exhibits "A" and "B" respectively.
2

deposition
hereto as

Charles Trimble was Getty's District Minerals Landman who
assisted in negotiating the terms of the Operating Agreement
between Getty and Gold Standard.
Cecil H. Smith was District
Minerals Exploration Manager for Getty at the time of the
original contract negotiations. The attorney that both of them
communicated with extensively was Royal Peterson, an in-house
lawyer who is now deceased.
t«t-f009.pl»
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS GETTY'S PETITION FOR AN
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE.

Gold Standard attempts to discredit Getty by accusing
Getty

of

Petition.

making

factual

assertions"

to

support

its

Such accusations, however, are simply not supported by

the evidence.
for

"false

Getty's

Gold Standard first asserts that there is no basis
claim

attorney-client

that

Kundert

communications.

and

Hautala

Gold

were

Standard

privy

to

attempts

to

support its position by reference to Kundert's testimony that he
was uncertain of the extent to which he was privy to attorneyclient communications.
misleading

Contrary to Gold Standard's selective and

quotations, however, Mr. Kundert did not "testify

unequivocally"

"that

he

was

not

a party

to

attorney-client

communications relating to the Mercur project while employed at
Getty."

Plaintiff's Memorandum at 4 (emphasis in original).

Rather, Kundert's testimony indicates that he regularly met with
Getty

attorneys

at

least

several

times

a

month

and

had

responsibility for several litigation matters, Kundert Deposition
at 27-28, but could not recall the extent or content of his
contacts concerning the Mercur project.

Kundert Deposition at

34-35.
For example, Mr. Kundert testified that he recalled
speaking with Jack
gct-ft009.pis

Sample, a Getty attorney, but could not

5

remember the content of the conversations.
33.

In addition, he testified

Kundert Deposition at

that he may have had other

contacts with counsel for Getty:
Q
(By Mr. Lowrie)
Aside from the
possibility of discussion of Mercur with
Mr. Sample with respect to the 10-K, are
you able to affirmatively tell me that
you did not discuss Mercur with lawyers,
including Mr. Sample, prior to October 1,
1980.
A
I can't be that positive because at
that meeting which you asked about
earlier, when I met Mr. Smith the only
time, there was a lawyer there. I think
— I'm sure Getty had a lawyer there and
maybe in the ensuing few weeks after that
I may have talked to one of our lawyers.
That's the only time I can remember.
Kundert Deposition at 34-35.

It is not surprising that Mr.

Kundert could not clearly remember the extent of his contacts
with

Getty

attorneys

communications
recollection.

nor

without

his

an

participation

opportunity

to

in

privileged

refr4esh

his

Mr. Hautala similarly could not recall specific

privileged communications.

He testified that while he regularly

sought out the advice of Getty attorneys and had almost daily
contact with Getty attorneys, Hautala Deposition at 20-22, he
could not remember the specifics of those attorney
without a chance to refresh his memory.
49-50.

contacts

Hautala Deposition at

The risk of ex parte communications in the instance of

Mr. Hautala

is underscored

by his inability to distinguish,

without refreshing his recollection, between privileged and nont«t~c009.pis
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privileged sources of information.

Hautala Deposition at 66-68.

Even though Mr. Kundert's exposure to privileged communications
was less frequent than Mr. Hautala's, the testimony indicates
that there were in fact such communications.

Furthermore, this

testimony emphasizes the inadequacy of requiring that Getty rely
on

the

former

employees

themselves

to

be

responsible

for

protecting Getty's privilege.
Moreover,

Getty's

log

of

privileged

documents

substantiates that both Kundert and Hautala were parties to a
number of protected written communications.

Of course, since

communications need not be written to be protected, the privilege
log is only a partial listing of privileged communications which
Getty has a right to protect.3
Gold Standard's interviews with these individuals are
even more disturbing in light of their testimony that neither was
ever asked not to reveal privileged communications.

Hautala

Deposition at 81-82, Kundert Deposition at 51.
Gold Standard additionally accuses Getty of making
false assertions regarding the content of the contact between
Gold Standard and former Getty employees.4

This accusation is

3

A copy of relevant portions of Getty's privilege log is
attached hereto as Exhibit "0".
4

Gold Standard does admit, however, that it has placed its
own interpretation on language selectively drawn from Getty's
Memorandum in Opposition to Gold Standard's Motion to Continue
Hearing and to Permit Limited Discovery (hereafter "Getty's
Memorandum Opposing a Continuance*) in order to arrive at its

similarly without basis.
communications and

Because Getty was not a party to these

is not privy to the full extent of Gold

Standard's contacts with former Getty employees, Getty has made
no

representations

communications.

regarding

the

actual

content

of

these

See Getty's Initial Memorandum at 4.

Gold Standard takes several sentences out of context
from Getty's Memorandum Opposing a Continuance to support its
claim that Getty falsely asserted that Gold Standard had in fact
obtained privileged communications from former Getty personnel.
Gold Standard
preceding

failed to mention, however, that the sentence

the

language

quoted

by

Gold

Standard

expressly

qualified Getty's position:
To the extent that Gold Standard has
improperly communicated with former Getty
employees and received confidential
communications o£ other evidence, Getty's
rights will continue to be impaired and
Getty may be further injured if this
information is used as the foundation for
additional discovery.
Getty's Memorandum Opposing a Continuance at 3 (emphasis added).5
accusations.

See Plaintiff's Memorandum at 6 n.3.

5

All of the language quoted by Gold Standard comes from
Getty's Memorandum Opposing a Continuance of the hearing
originally scheduled on this matter. It was Getty's intent to
emphasize that a further delay in bringing this matter before the
court might be adverse to Getty's interests. For that reason,
Getty had to identify the potential ways in which it might be
injured by further delay. significantly, Gold Standard did not
identify any similar "assertions" in Getty's Initial Memorandum
which addresses the substantive issues currently before the
court.
t«t-g009.pl»
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In any event, besides being clearly erroneous, Gold
Standard's argument that Kundert and Hautala were not privy to
privileged

communications is irrelevant to Getty's position,6

Getty maintains that the contacts, regardless of content, were
improper and, further, that Getty should be able to protect its
own

attorney

Although

Gold

client
Standard

privilege

without

continues

to

relying

represent

on
that

others.
it

has

resisted discussion of privileged information, Gold Standard's
attorneys admit that they contacted Joseph Berg III, a former
Getty

attorney,

in an attempt to speak with him privately.

Lowrie Affidavit, % 3.

The fact that Berg declined to meet with

them does not alter the fact that they contacted him and were
willing to discuss the case with him.

This fact unequivocally

colors the reliability of the assurances given.

b

The Affidavits of Gold Standard attorneys George W. Pratt
and James S. Lowrie, as well as the depositions of Kundert and
Hautala raise a number of similarly irrelevant issues. First, it
is irrelevant whether or not the former employees approached Gold
Standard's attorneys on their own initiative or whether the
attorneys made the first contact. Whether the attorney's solicit
the contact or merely accept an invitation, the contact is
improper. See e.g.. Shelton v. Hess, 599 F. Supp. 905, 911 (S.D.
Tex. 1984).
Second, the fact that the former employees do not
claim that they were harassed or intimidated does not make the
contact proper*
g«t-g009.pis
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II.

EX PARTE CONTACT WITH FORMER MANAGERIAL
EMPLOYEES IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE UTAH
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
Despite the myriad of arguments advanced by Gold

Standard, the express language of the Comment to Rule 4.2 of the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct makes it clear that ex parte
contact with former managerial employees of a corporation is
improper.

The Rule prohibits contact with current managerial

employees and
any other person whose act or omission in
connection with the matter [in dispute]
may be imputed to the organization for
purposes of civil or criminal liability
or whose statement may constitute an
admission
on
the
part
of
the
organization.
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2, comment (1988) (emphasis
added).

Gold Standard focuses solely on the straw man of whether

the present statements of former employees can bind or be imputed
to the corporation.
disjunctive.

The sentence in the Comment, however, is

Statements which may constitute admissions form

only the second part of the disjunction.

The first part does not

apply

acts

to

present

statements

but

to

connection with the matter in representation.

or

omissions

in

As such, it covers

former, as well as current, employees.
Gold Standard would have the court effectively alter
the language of the comment to read "any other current employee."
The comment, however, contains no such limitation and expressly
get-g009.pis
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covers "any other person* whose act or omission in connection
with

the

subject

corporation.

of

the

Because

litigation

litigation

can

be

invariably

imputed

to the

involves matters

which occurred prior to the filing of the lawsuit, as often as
not,

those

whose

acts

or

omissions

can

be

imputed

to

an

organization in connection with the dispute will no longer work
for the organization.

The permissibility of ex parte contacts

ought not to depend upon the fortuitous factor of whether an
employee remains employed throughout the litigation.
Gold

Standard's

Memorandum

mischaracterizes the relevant consideration.

completely

Gold Standard first

argues in Section IV.A. of its Memorandum that the "current
statements" of

former Getty

Getty as admissions."7

employees cannot possibly "bind"

Plaintiff's Memorandum at 16.

It next

argues in Section IV.B. that the statements of former employees
cannot be imputed to Getty.

Plaintiff's Memorandum at 22.

This

is little more than a restatement of the first argument.

Gold

Standard's misunderstanding of Getty's argument is demonstrated
by its erroneous restatement of Getty's position:
In Getty's view# the fact that a former
employee
once possessed
speaking
authority means, contrary to common
sense, that his current statements can

7

Getty acknowledges that the weight of authority
interpreting Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Rules of Evidence has found
that only current employees can makes statements which will bind
the corporation. That, however, is not the issue here.
S«t-f009.pis

li

still be "imputed" to his employer within
the meaning of the Rule [4.2].
Plaintiff's Memorandum at 23 (emphasis in original).8
Getty's

argument

is

not

directed

managerial employees' current statements.

toward

former

Rather, consistent

with the comment to Rule 4,2, Getty's argument is that the "act
or omission" of a former managerial employee in connection with a
matter

in

dispute

"may

be

imputed

to the

purposes of civil and criminal liability."

organization

for

The language of the

Comment to Rule 4.2 includes former managerial employees who had
responsibilities related to the Mercur project.
essentially admits this in its Memorandum:

Gold Standard

"Getty is correct in

its assertion that plaintiff will attempt to "impute" to Getty
any favorable evidence it may learn by interviewing former Getty

B

See also Id. at 26 ("The former Getty employees are now
people who have knowledge of what Getty did. Although they can
describe past conduct that may have been binding on Getty when it
occurred, they presently have no authority to bind Getty")
(emphasis added).
Again Gold Standard focuses only on present
statements and neglects to identify the individuals whose past
conduct may be binding on Getty. If Gold Standard truly believes
that a former management employee's "act or omission in
connection with th[is] matter" cannot "be imputed to the
organization [Getty] for purposes of civil liability" in this
case, then Getty asks that Gold Standard so stipulate. Getty
believes that Gold Standard would be unwilling to enter such a
stipulation because it intends to impute former managerial
employees' actions to Getty. See Plaintiff's Memorandum at 25.
Gold Standard cannot have it both ways. Either the Comment to
Rule 4.2 expressly includes former management employees or acts
or omissions of former Getty management employees, as a matter of
law, cannot be imputed to Getty for purposes of civil liability.
»et-g009.pis

12

employees."

Plaintiff's Memorandum at 25.

What Gold Standard

fails to mention is that the "favorable evidence" might include
the "acts or omissions" of the former employee being interviewed.
Recognizing the impact of the express language of the
Comment to Rule 4.2, Gold Standard criticizes it as "vague and
poorly worded."

Gold Standard would apparently have the court

ignore the Comment on that basis.
this

Comment

refinement

has

been

It should be remembered that

subjected

to

the

promulgation

and

of a number of autonomous groups, including final

approval and adoption by the Utah Supreme Court.9
that the Comment

is poorly worded

A contention

suggests merely that Gold

Standard is dissatisfied with the result of its clear mandate in
this case.

The Comment cannot simply be ignored or disregarded

because Gold Standard believes it is poorly worded.
The
irrelevant.

current

employment

status

The relevant distinction

of

an employee

is

is whether or not the

individual's prior acts or omissions can be used to bind the
corporation.

This is equivalent to the distinction between a

bystander and non-bystander witness.

9

A bystander witness is one

Over a six-year period and following a number of drafts,
the American Bar Association adopted Rule 4.2 and its
accompanying comment as part of the ABA Model Rules in 1983. An
ad hoc committee appointed by the Utah Supreme Court recommended
adoption of the ABA Model Rules with suggested alterations. The
Supreme Court accepted, rejected, or modified in part the
suggested alterations. Finally, the Rules were submitted to the
entire bar for comment. Following this procedure, the Rules were
formally adopted by the Utah Supreme Court as of January 1, 1988.
g«t-g009 .pit
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who witnessed, but was not otherwise participating, in an event.
A non-bystander witness on the other hand is one whose actions or
involvement

may

have

potential liability.

contributed

to

the

existence

of

the

In actions involving individuals, everyone

but the individual himself is a bystander witness.

In actions

involving corporations, some current and former employees are
bystander witnesses while other current and former employees are
non-bystander witnesses.

Employees who constitute the party are

distinguishable from bystander witnesses by their authority to
commit the organization to a position regarding the subject
matter of the litigation.
In the case of a corporation, unfair advantage may be
obtained by contacting either (1) those who can presently bind
the

corporation; or

(2) those whose actions could bind the

corporation respecting a matter which occurred previously and
which is now the subject of litigation.

The operative critical

factor in either case is not current employment status but the
potential of the person to bind the corporation; either through
current statements or as a result of past actions.
Contrary to the assertions of Gold Standard, the
cases, with one exception, are consistent with this approach.10
In support of its position that the Comment to Rule 4.2 covers
10

Wright v. Group Health Hospital. 103 Wash. 2d 192, 691
P.2d 564 (1984), rejected the approach required by the Comment to
Rule 4.2. For reasons discussed below, the reasoning of Wright
should not be applied by the court in this case.
|et-|009.pli

14

only current employees, Gold Standard cites Massa v. Eaton Corp..
109 F.R.D. 312 (W.D. Mich 1985).
inapposite to this case.

Massa. however, is completely

In Massa, the district court reversed a

magistrate's ruling which allowed ex parte contact with current
managerial

employees,

holding

that

impermissible under DR 7-104(A)(1).

such

contacts

were

Nowhere in the opinion does

the court limit its ruling to current employees or in anyway
distinguish current employees from former employees.
Gold

Standard

also

relies

heavily

upon

Amarin

Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp.. 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass
1987).

Amarin

position.

does

not,

however,

support

Gold

Standard's

As was explained in Getty's Initial Memorandum at 11-

12 n.7, the

former corporate president with whom

the court

permitted ex parte contact in Amarin "left the employ of the
defendant prior to the contract dispute that form[ed] the basis
of the litigation."

Amarin. 116 F.R.D. at 40 (emphasis added).

Thus, the critical fact was not the corporate president's status
as a former employee, but the fact that he was not in any way
involved with the contract dispute forming the basis of the
litigation.

His acts or omissions, therefore, could not be

imputed to the corporation for purposes of the civil liability
involved in the case.11
11 The court in Amarin distinguished the situation from that
in Sperber v. Washington Heiahts-W. Harlem-Inwood Mental Health
Council. Inc., Civ. No. 82-7428 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1983) vacated
and withdrawn, a situation much closer to this case.
In so
»et-g009.pis
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The other cases cited by Gold Standard are similarly
inapposite or are actually supportive of Getty's position.

In

Frey v. Department of Health and Human Servs.. 106 F.R.D. 32
(E.D.N.Y. 1985)

(magistrate's order),

a woman brought a sex

discrimination action against her employer, a government agency.
The plaintiff agreed "not to have any ex parte communication with
the

high

level

managerial

employees

employment decision at issue . . . ."

responsible

Id. at 34.

for

the

In ruling on

the plaintiff's right to ex parte contacts, the magistrate agreed
that

"at

least

the

high

level

managerial

employees

who

participated in the decision not to promote plaintiff fall within
[the definition of 'party']."

Id. at 35. The court in Frey made

no attempt to distinguish former employees in its ruling.

To the

extent Frev is interpreted to cover former employees, there is no
basis to assume that the court would have permitted interviews
with

former

decision."

"managerial

employees

who

participated

in

the

Moreover, the court in Frey recognized that a broader

definition may be appropriate where the government is not a
party:

"There is even stronger reason to construe the term

"party" in DR 7-104 narrowly in the case where the defendant is a
government employer." Id. at 37.

doing, the court assumed without deciding that the language of
the Comment to Rule 4.2 was broad enough to cover former
managerial employees. Id.
§et-*009 .pis
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In Mompoint v. Lotus Development Corp.. 1106 F.R.D. 414
(D. Mass. 1986) (magistrate's order), the plaintiff brought an
employment discrimination case against Lotus, alleging that he
was wrongfully terminated because of his race.
asserted

Part of Lotus'

reason for terminating plaintiff was its claim that

plaintiff

pressured

female

employees

for

sexual

favors.

Plaintiff's counsel wanted to conduct ex parte interviews with
the female employees who complained of advances by the plaintiff.
However, the employees involved were not managerial employees
responsible

for

the

decision

to

terminate

the

plaintiff's

employment.

The magistrate's ruling therefore made no reference

to managerial employees or former employees.12
The only case actually supporting Gold Standard's
position is Wright v. Group Health Hospital. 103 Wash. 2d 192,
691 P.2d 564 (1984).

However, although the ruling in Wright was

framed in broad terms, the issue before this court was never
before the court in Wright.

The plaintiff in Wright wanted to

conduct ex parte interviews with nurses at a hospital regarding

12

Judge Daniels in Allen Steel Co. v. Okland-Fouloer Co. .
Civ. No. C-80-9512 (Third Dist. Ct. May 4, 1984), permitted ex
parte contact with specifically identified classes of lower level
former employees. Even so, Judge Daniels precluded admission in
the trial of any evidence obtained through such ex parte
contacts. The Allen Steel opinion did not involve mid-level and
upper management employees similarly situated to those involved
in this case. Where low-level employees are involved there is
not the same danger that their past actions will be imputed to
the corporation or that they have been party to confidential
attorney-client communications.
get-g009.pis
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an

alleged

incident

of

medical

malpractice

plaintiff's labor and delivery of a baby.
the plaintiff's attorney

involving

the

The court noted that

limited his request by seeking the

*right to interview ex parte both current and former Group Health
employees so long as they were not management employees."

Id. at

566 (emphasis added).
The court in Wright made only parenthetical mention
of the Comment to Rule 4.2.

The court's position makes it clear

that it declined to adopt the provisions of the Comment:
We find no reason to distinguish between
employees who in fact witnessed an event
and those whose act or omission caused
the event leading to the action.
Wright. 691 P.2d at 569.

This is an express rejection of the

approach taken by the Comment to Rule 4.2 and is the only case of
which Getty is aware which has taken this position.
As

described

in

acknowledged by Gold Standard

Getty's

Initial

Memorandum

and

in its Memorandum, the federal

district court for the district of Montana held in Porter v. Arco
Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Mont. 1986), that the plaintiff
could not conduct ex parte interviews with "present or former
employees with managerial responsibilities concerning the matter
in litigation. . . ."

Id. at 1118 (emphasis added).

Subsequent

to Getty's initial Memorandum, the federal district court for the
district of Kansas has reached a similar ruling.
Boeing Co.. Civ. No. 85-6131,
S«t*t009.pis
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Chancellor v.

, 1988 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 1030 (D. Kan. Feb. 3, 1988) (a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit " D " ) . Acknowledging that the court in Wright
had held otherwise, the court stated that,

#

[w]hen a former

employee's acts or omission in connection with the matter in
representation may be imputed to the corporation, then he or she
may be a 'party.'"

LEXIS Slip op. at 5 (citing Amarin. Sperber,

and MGM Grand). 13

13

Because of the absence of broad support for its position
in judicial decisions, Gold Standard places considerable emphasis
on selected advisory opinions of committees of various state bar
associations.
These opinions, however, which Gold Standard
admits are split, are of no precedential value. Such opinions
are not rendered in an adjudicative or adversarial context.
Thus, they are decided without the benefit of briefing or
argument. Cf. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State
Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298, 301 (E.D. Va. 1977) vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1978); Consumers Union
of United States, Inc. v. American Bar Assoc, 427 F. Supp. 506,
514 (E.D. Va. 1976) vacated and remanded on other grounds, 438
U.S. 917 (1977). They are advisory only and are not binding on
the courts of even the state whose bar association produced them.
See e.g., In re Advisory Opinion of Kentucky State Bar Assoc,
361 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962).
Moreover, none of the opinions cited by Gold Standard
include any factual background and, in most instances, are not
even based on specific factual circumstances.
This makes it
impossible to analogize to or distinguish from such opinions.
££. Black v. State of Mo.. 492 F. Supp. 848, 861, 874-75 (W.D.
Mo. 1980).
Finally, a review of the abstracts provided by Gold
Standard reveals that only the abstract of the Colorado Opinion
even mentions the existence of the Comment to Rule 4.2, and then
only as a secondary citation regarding a separate issue. The
only reasoning evident in the digest of the Colorado Opinion is
the Committee's conclusion that *[a]fter leaving the
organization's employ a former employee cannot bind the
organization as a matter of law."
The Comment to Rule 4.2,
however, makes it clear that a person's ability to. bind the
corporation by his or her statements is only one part of the
coverage of the rule.
g€t-*009.pis
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III.

GOLD STANDARD'S CLAIMED INTERESTS DO NOT
JUSTIFY PAST OR FUTURE EX PARTE CONTACTS
WITH GETTY'S FORMER MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES.
Gold

Standard

argues that

it has

"an important,

judicially recognized interest in conducting informal discovery•"
Specifically,

Gold

Standard

conducted more economically

argues

that

"litigation

and expeditiously

can

be

if counsel may

informally interview the individuals who have knowledge of the
pertinent facts." Plaintiff's Memorandum at 14-15.
These
otherwise

impermissible

management.
minimally
Numerous

interests

provide

no

basis

for

ex parte contacts with

conducting

former Getty

In this case, these interests will be, at best, only

aided

by

individuals

a right to conduct ex parte interviews.
will

yet

be

deposed

in

this

action,

including Hautala and Kundert whom Gold Standard has already
contacted ex parte.

In Scott Smith's Affidavit, he indicates

that he has spoken with Robert Blair, Charles Trimble and Cecil
Smith,

all

former

Getty

employees

who

have

indicated

a

willingness to meet privately with Gold Standard's attorneys.
However, Gold Standard has not represented that ex parte contact
with these individuals will eliminate the need to depose any of
them.

In fact, there is little doubt that all of these former

Getty employees will be deposed whether or not this court allows
ex parte contact by Gold Standard's counsel.
purely
tet~g009.pis

tactical

advantage

Aside from the

of meeting with ,these
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individuals

outside the presence of Getty's counsel, Gold Standard has not
demonstrated that costs or time will be significantly reduced by
conducting ex parte interviews.
In addition,
much.

Gold

Standard's

argument

proves too

Almost all ethics and discovery rules potentially may

increase the expense and decrease the convenience of the parties
to litigation.

Expense and convenience are relevant only if the

rule specifically takes such considerations into account or if
the expense and inconvenience are particularly exceptional and
onerous.

Otherwise, the rules would become little more than

suggestions which could be swept aside at the first sign of
expense or burden on a party.
interest

require

an attorney

For example, some conflicts of
to withdraw

from

representation

after expending considerable time and resources in behalf of a
client.

Time and expense, however, do not justify ignoring or

tolerating such a conflict.

See, e.g.. Marcrulies v. Upchurch,

696 P.2d 1195, 1205 (Utah 1985) (disqualifying party's counsel
despite the

"considerable hardship" "thereby

imposed

on [the

plaintiffs]").
The two cases cited by Gold Standard in support of
its efficiency argument, Frey v. Department of Department of
Health and Human Services, 106 F.R.D. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) and
Mompoint v. Lotus Development Corp., 116 F.R.D. 414 (D. Mass,
1986), are completely inapposite.

Both cases involved single

individuals who brought employment discrimination actions against
get-ft009.pls
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their

employer

or

former

employer.

Neither

case

involved

attempts to interview former managerial employees.
The consideration of cost and the interest of justice
discussed in those cases must be viewed under the peculiar facts
of each case.

For example, in Frey, a woman brought a sex

discrimination claim against her employer, the Social Security
Administration.

The court's discussion of costs is narrowly

tailored to the peculiar facts of the case:
[T]o permit the SSA to barricade huge
numbers of potential witnesses from
interviews except through
costly
discovery procedures, may well frustrate
the right of an individual plaintiff with
limited resources to a fair trial and
deter other litigants from pursuing their
legal remedies.
Id.

at

36

(emphasis

added).

Similarly,

in

Mompoint.

the

plaintiff seeking to interview current employees was a terminated
employee bringing an employment discrimination suit based upon
race and ethnic origin.

Unlike the plaintiffs in Frev and

Mompoint, the plaintiff in this case is a corporation seeking a
huge judgment against other corporations.

"Costly discovery

procedures" are an ongoing and unavoidable element of this case
and Gold Standard has offered no evidence that the number of
depositions or the quantity of written discovery will be reduced
as a result of ex parte contacts.
interests

in

discrimination
*et-t009.pis
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cases

are

where

less

Furthermore, the societal
than

procedural
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in

race

and

sex

roadblocks

can

significantly deter vindication of federally created rights of
action.

Finally, neither Frey nor Mompoint involved attempted

interviews of managerial employees who participated in events
forming the basis of the litigation.
Getty's interest in its right to effective use of
counsel,

on

subsequent

the

other

events,

hand,

unrelated

is
to

significant.

this

Because

case, Getty

no

of

longer

employs any of the management personnel who were responsible for
negotiating and implementing the agreement between Getty and Gold
Standard.

Getty's right to effective use of counsel requires

that it be able to protect its interests by being present when
those who acted in its behalf are questioned or asked to sign
affidavits regarding the events which occurred while they were in
the employ of Getty.
Although Gold Standard argues that its purpose in
conducting ex parte interviews is to facilitate fact finding and
expedite preliminary investigation, the Affidavit of Charles J.
Kundert, prepared by Gold Standard in conjunction with its ex
parte interview of Kundert, demonstrates that Gold Standard's
intent goes beyond fact finding.

Kundert's Affidavit includes

statements reflecting Kundert's view that the engineering study
prepared by Bechtel was not intended to be a "Final Bankable
Document" and his understanding that Bechtel did not consider its
engineering

study

to be a feasibility

Charles J. Kundert at % 11
tet-t009.pl*

study.

Affidavit of

(a copy of which is attached as
23

Exhibit "E").

Additional statements in the Affidavit suggest

that others at Getty questioned whether or not a "feasibility
study" existed for the Mercur Project.

I£. at H

8, 11.

In his

deposition, however, Kundert testified that he also told Gold
Standard's attorneys that he personally did consider the Bechtel
study to constitute
Agreement.

a feasibility

study under the Operating

Kundert Deposition at 54-56. This critical aspect of

Kundert's communication with Gold Standard's attorneys was not
included in the Affidavit even though it was directly relevant to
the subject matter of the Affidavit.
evidence

set

forth

The selective nature of the

in the Affidavit

reveals Gold

Standard's

intent to use the ex parte interviews with former Getty personnel
as a strategic tool against Getty, rather than simply as an
informal fact-gathering tool.

It also emphasizes the inequity of

permitting Gold Standard to continue or make use of ex parte
contracts of witnesses that will be closely identified with Getty
at trial.

In this particular circumstance, the policy of the

rule as an attempt to prevent overreaching by the lawyers applies
as

significantly

to

former employees

as it does to current

employees.
No case cited by Gold Standard has allowed ex parte
contact with management level personnel, current or former, based
on considerations of economy and efficiency.
improper absent the consent of Getty's counsel.

tct-g009.pis
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Such contacts are

IV.

GETTY'S ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE CAN BE PROTECTED
ONLY BY PROHIBITING EX PARTE CONTACT WITH FORMER
MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES.

Gold Standard erroneously argues that the "evidence
plainly

demonstrates

that

former

Getty

employees

can

be

interviewed without any risk of intrusion upon Getty's attorneyclient privilege."

Plaintiff's Memorandum at 29.

However, the

facts, as admitted by Gold Standard, demonstrate the risk to
Getty's

privilege

in allowing

ex parte

contact with

former

employees.
Gold Standard acknowledges that if ex parte contacts
are permitted, Getty must rely on its former employees or Gold
Standard's attorneys to protect its privilege.

Gold Standard

represents, however, that it is capable of protecting Getty from
disclosure of privileged information by former Getty employees.
This position is wholly inconsistent with the premises underlying
our adversary system.14
each

party

is

representation.

Our adversary system presupposes that

entitled
Gold

to

its

Standard's

own

individual,

proposition

that

zealous
it would

protect Getty's privilege would seem to place Gold Standard in
the position of representing interests at odds with each other.
14

Indeed, the assumptions behind the adversary system
require that the party to whom a privilege belongs is the party
entitled to assert that privilege.
For example, parties
routinely conduct privilege review of documents and create
privilege logs rather than simply producing privileged documents
and relying on their adversaries to honor the privilege.
»et-g009.pl#
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It is further an inadequate solution for former Getty
employees to be expected to protect the privilege on behalf of
Getty*

Privileged communications between Getty's counsel and

former employees during said employees' tenure with Getty remain
subject to the privilege until and unless the privilege is waived
by

Getty's

information

current
is

management.15

divulged

by

a

However,

former

once

employee,

privileged

even

if the

privilege is not deemed officially waived, the damage is done.
Moreover, as was revealed during the deposition of
Hautala, memories of former employees are often vague and may
need to be refreshed to recognize the source of the information
inquired about.

In addition, such non-lawyer employees may not

have a full understanding of the parameters of the privilege.
Hautala Deposition at 75.

Thus, it is entirely possible that

15

The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of which
corporate actors are empowered to waive a corporation's attorneyclient privilege in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Weintraub. 471 U.S. 343, 105 S.Ct. 1986 (1985). While Weintraub
centered on the issue of the ability to assert the privilege in
the context of a bankruptcy, the principles enunciated therein
are controlling as to whether former employees of a solvent
corporation have the ability to waive or assert the privilege.
In discussing the applicability of the privilege to a bankrupt
corporation, the Court began with the proposition that "in
solvent corporations, the power to waive the corporate attorneyclient privilege rests with the corporation's management." Id.
at 1991.
"[W]hen control of a corporation passes to new
management, the authority to assert and waive the corporation's
attorney-client privilege passes as well."
I£.
Therefore,
*[d]isplaced managers may not assert the privilege over the
wishes of current managers, even as to statements that the former
might have made to counsel concerning matters within the scope of
their corporate duties." Id.
§«t-t009.pis
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privileged

information

could

be

inadvertently

divulged,

regardless of the best efforts of Gold Standard's counsel and the
former employee involved.16

The ethical rules are designed to

prevent entirely such a possibility.
v.

Patentex.

Inc. 478

F.2d

Cf.

562, 571

Emle Industries. Inc.
(2nd Cir. 1973)

("[a]

lawyer's good faith, although essential in all his professional
activity,

is

nevertheless,

protecting

confidential

an

inadequate

information]

when

safeguard

standing

[for

alone").

Thus, the mere possibility that confidential information may be
divulged mandates that Getty's Petition be granted, regardless of
whether any intentional disclosure of privileged information has,
in fact, occurred in the past.
Finally, Gold Standard suggests that Getty's position
somehow encroaches on the free speech rights of former employees.
As

to

privileged

material,

preventing

disclosure

by

former

employees is no more an encroachment on free speech rights than
preventing

disclosure by a current employee

involved in the communication.

or the attorney

Certainly, Gold Standard is not

suggesting that an attorney or employee of the corporation has a
right to disclose privileged corporate communications at will.
In any event, the restrictions of DR 7-104 and Rule 4.2 apply to

16

Parties routinely rely on their counsel to assist them in
identifying and protecting privileged information. Allowing Gold
Standard to engage in ex parte communications with former Getty
employees will rob Getty of the opportunity for this type of assistance.
t«t-*009.pis
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the attorney undertaking the ex parte communication, not to the
current or former corporate employee being interviewed.
V.

THE SANCTIONS WHICH GETTY SEEKS ARE APPROPRIATE AND
NECESSARY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
Without citing to any authority, Gold Standard argues

emphatically

that

the

sanctions

sought

by

Getty

are

inappropriate.

Getty has petitioned the court to issue an order

prohibiting further ex parte contacts and requiring Gold Standard
to turn over to Getty those items which have resulted from
improper contacts.

These sanctions are appropriate.

The courts have the authority and responsibility to
remedy violations

of the Code of Professional Responsibility

which occur in the course of a case by imposing sanctions against
a party and its attorneys.
1195

(Utah

1985)

See Maraulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d

(disqualifying

plaintiff's

attorneys

for

violations of Canons 4, 5, and 9 of the former Utah Code of
Professional

Responsibility) .

In

Musicus

v.

Westinahouse

Electric Corp.. 621 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1980), the court stated:
The district court was incorrect in
its view that breaches of attorney-client
privileges or other ethical duties can
only be raised in separate grievance
proceedings brought against counsel,
[citation omitted]. A district court is
obliged to take measures against
unethical conduct occurring in connection
with any proceeding before it.
Id. at 744.

»et-g009.pis
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This power to enforce ethical violations includes the
ability

to

impose

sanctions

which

are

less

drastic

than

disqualification, including exclusion of evidence and discovery
of work-product.

See Bruske v. Arnold, 44 111. 2d 132, 254

N.E.2d 453 (1969), cert, denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970) (statement
obtained in violation of Canon 9 excluded for all purposes from
trial)(a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "F").

The

court in Bruske stated:
In reaching this opinion, we are not unmindful
that rules of discovery should not necessarily
operate as exclusionary rules of evidence or that
separate procedures exist for the regulation and
discipline of unethical conduct on the part of
attorneys.
Rules, however, to be effective must
carry an appropriate sanction; otherwise, the orderly
process of a lawsuit is left to the mercy of the
individual's sense of justice.
We deem that the
appropriate sanction in this instance was the
exclusion from evidence of the statement.
Id. at 456.

See also United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112

(10th Cir.), cert, denied. 412 U.S. 932 (1973) (excluding from
evidence a statement obtained

in violation of DR 7-104

in a

criminal case, the court stated: "To hold otherwise would be to
overlook conduct which violated both the letter and the spirit of
the canons of ethics").
Furthermore,

it

is

appropriate

to

impose

the

sanctions against the party even though it is the actions of the
party's attorney which give rise to the sanctions.
law provides:

get-g009.pis
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Established

There is certainly no merit to the
contention that dismissal of petitioner's
claim because of his counsel's unexcused
conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the
client.
Petitioner voluntarily chose
this attorney as his representative in
the action and he cannot now avoid the
consequences of the acts or omissions of
this freely selected agent.
Link v. Wabash R.R.. 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962).

See also Farm

Construction Servs. v. Fudge. 831 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1987);
Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp.. 602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979) ("A litigant chooses
counsel at his peril [citing Link]. and here, as in countless
other

contexts,

counsel's

disregard

of

his

professional

responsibilities can lead to extinction of his client's claim").
In
Supreme

Court

a

recent

upheld

a

criminal
state

appeal, the

United

States

court decision precluding

the

testimony of a witness because of defense counsel's violation of
a discovery rule.
646 (1988) .

See Taylor v. Illinois.

U.S.

, 108 S. Ct.

Defense counsel argued that the lawyer's misconduct

should not lead to the exclusion of evidence which was important
to the defendant's case.

The Supreme Court found the "argument

that the client should not be held responsible for his lawyer's
misconduct" to be unpersuasive.

Jd. at 657. 17

17

Such a sanction

The court found the preclusion of the testimony to be
proper even though the state discovery statute had a provision
for *[d]irect punitive sanctions against the attorney." Id. at
666 (Brennan J., dissenting).
»et-g009.pis
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should

be

equally

or more

available

in a civil case where

constitutional rights are correspondingly weaker.
Finally,
Standard's

Getty's

attorneys'

work

request

for

production

product

is

justified

of
in

Gold
cases

involving evidence obtained through an ethical violation. For
example, in Parrott v. Wilson.

707 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir.), cert,

denied. 464 U.S. 936 (1983), the court ruled that where a party's
attorney "clandestinely taped telephone conversations" with two
witnesses, the court could order disclosure of the work-product
since

recording

of conversations

consent is unethical.
F.2d

795,

800

of witnesses without

Id. at 1271.

(D.C. Cir.

1981)

their

See also Moodv v. IRS. 654
("in

some

circumstances, a

lawyer's unprofessional behavior may vitiate the work product
privilege").

Paraphrasing Moody. the court in Parrott reasoned

that "the purpose of the work product privilege is to protect the
integrity

of

the

adversary

process; therefore,

it would

be

improper to allow an attorney to exploit the privilege for ends
that are antithetical to that process."

Parrott. 707 F.2d at

1271.
Since
management

Gold

employees

Standard's

interviews

with

former

of Getty were improper, Gold Standard's

attorneys should not be able to use the work product privilege to
withhold the work product which resulted from those interviews.
The improper conduct in this case is analogous to the ethical
violation extant in Parrott.
get-g009.pl*
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should

require

documents,

Gold

written

Standard's

or taped

attorneys

to

statements, and

produce

all

other materials

received from former Getty management employees, as well as all
notes and summaries prepared by any person which were recorded or
made during or after those contacts or interviews.
Much

of Gold

Standard's

argument

against

turning

materials over to Getty is little more than a repeat of its
argument that the contacts were proper.

Gold Standard defends

its continued possession and use of the Kundert Affidavit by
stating

that

Kundert

"properly

responded

to his duty, as a

citizen, to assist litigation by providing his recollection of
material facts."

Plaintiff's Memorandum at 33-34.

As emphasized

above, Getty is not questioning Kundert's actions.
conduct

of

Gold

Standard's

attorneys

in

It is the

contacting

and/or

participating in interviews with former Getty employees and the
fact

that

the

attorneys

sought

and

obtained

information,

documents, and a signed Affidavit through ex parte contact which
violates the Rules of Professional Conduct.
While
which

would

Gold

"place

Standard

any

vigorously

restriction

on

resists
the

any

future

order

use

of

[Kundert's] affidavit," it argues that the statements of former
employees cannot be attributed to nor acts or omissions imputed
to the corporation.

Gold Standard cannot have it both ways.

If

ex parte contact with former management personnel is merely a
fact finding tool which works no injustice on Getty, then there
get-t009.pl*
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is no need to use the material which it obtained at trial.

The

very fact that such material has been sought and obtained outside
the presence and without the knowledge of Getty's attorneys
emphasizes the inappropriate nature of the contacts in this case.
Gold Standard argues that the sanctions sought by
Getty are unduly harsh and unprecedented.
sanctions sought here are reasonable.

To the contrary, the

Getty does not seek to

disqualify Gold Standard's attorneys or otherwise sanction Gold
Standard beyond that which is minimally necessary to restore
Getty to its position in this litigation before the improper
contacts occurred.
VI.

GETTY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING THE RELIEF FOR
WHICH IT HAS PETITIONED THE COURT.
Gold

Standard

incorrectly

contends

that Getty

is

estopped from seeking the relief it has requested pursuant to its
order to show cause.

Without citing any Utah authority, Gold

Standard implies, through its emphasis on the timing of Getty's
Petition, that Getty can be estopped from seeking this relief
because it did not immediately run to court seeking relief at the
earliest possible notice that improper contacts had occurred.
The facts in this case simply do not support Gold
Standard's estoppel theory.

In summarizing Utah law of estoppel,

the Utah Court of Appeals recently emphasized that estoppel
requires more than the mere allegation of delay:

tct~g009.pis
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speak or act.18

This is especially true once the person has made

his position known to the other party.

See Leaver v. Grose, 610

P. 2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1980).
In this case, Gold Standard made it clear that it has
never felt it needed the consent of Getty or its counsel prior to
making

contacts

contacts

and

with

former

attempted

learned of the contacts.

Getty

contacts

employees.

occurred

A

before

number
Getty

of

ever

In a Letter from James S. Lowrie to

Gordon L. Roberts dated February 11, 1987, Mr. Lowrie stated:
I do not intend to give you advance
notice any time I try to do any
investigation in regard to those matters.
I don't think I am required to do that
under the rules and I don't think that
you are entitled to have such close
control
of
our
work
product.
Furthermore, your client's former
employees have done an adequate job of
protecting themselves. . . .
Please consider that I have taken
your request [to notify Getty's attorneys
of plans to contact former employees ex
parte] under consideration, discussed it
with our work team over here, and that we
deny it.

18

French v. Johnson. 16 Utah 2d 360, 401 P.2d 315, 315
(Utah 1965) ; See also Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National
Building Company. 89 Utah 456, 57 P.2d 1099, 1125 (Utah 1936).
Warpar Mfg. Corp. v. Ashland Oil. Inc.. 606 F. Supp. 852 (N.D.
Ohio 1984), cited by Gold Standard, involved very different
circumstances which the court itself termed "unique.* Id. at
853. Plaintiffs were aware of a potential conflict of interest
for nearly two years before filing a motion to disqualify
defendants counsel six weeks before trial. The case had already
been ongoing for six years.
get-g009.pis

35

gee also Affidavit of James S. Lowrie at ^ 6.

Gold Standard has

never claimed that it would have stopped its contacts with former
Getty employees if it would have known of Getty#s continued
opposition.

To the contrary, it openly represented that it

intended to continue such contacts without even notifying Getty's
attorneys.
Getty informed Gold Standard that it opposed any ex
parte contact with former Getty employees.

Despite this, Gold

Standard now argues that the contacts were permissible because
Getty's former counsel concluded a letter with the phrase "so be
it.*

However,

unequivocally

Gold

informed

Standard

has

been

consistently

and

of Getty's objectives, and cannot now

contend that those contacts took place with Getty's blessing.
No reasonable person would conclude that Getty had
consented to ex parte contact by Gold Standard's counsel.

Thus,

there is no theory under which Gold Standard can invoke the
doctrine of estoppel to preclude Getty from seeking the sanctions
requested.
CONCLUSION
The Court should rule that ex parte contacts which
have occurred with former management level employees of Getty
were

improper.

contacts

by

The court should prohibit

Gold

Standard's

counsel

with

further ex parte
former

managerial

employees without the presence or consent from Getty's attorneys.
Finally,
ft«t-g009.pls

Getty

asks

that

the

court
36

grant

its

request

for

production of the documents and notes obtained or produced in
connection with the ex parte contacts.
DATED this

/5"~

day of March, 1988.
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS

Stephen G. Crockett, Esq.
Attorneys for Getty Oil Company
and Getty Mining Company
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37

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^ j ^ d a y of March, 1988, a true and
correct

copy

of

the

foregoing

"Getty's Reply

to

Plaintiff's

Substitute Memorandum in Opposition to Getty's Petition for Order
to Show Cause," was hand-delivered to the following:
James S. Lowrie
George W. Pratt
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gordon L. Roberts
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Robert M. McDonald
MCDONALD & BULLEN
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

1
2
3

GOLD STANDARD, INC.,
Plaintiff,

4

vs.

6

AMERICAN BARRICK RESOURCES
CORPORATION; BARRICK MERCUR
GOLD MINES, INC.; TEXACO, INC
(a severed party); GETTY OIL
COMPANY; GETTY MINING COMPANY
GETTY GOLD MINE COMPANY; and
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10,
Defendants,

6
7
8

NO. CV-86-S74
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9
30
11

DEPOSITION OF ROBERT L. HAUTALA

12

Deposition upon oral examination of ROBERT L.

13

HAUTALA, taken at the request of the Plaintiff,

14

before Kevin Moll, a notary public, at the 11th

15

Floor Conference Room, Washington Trust Financial

16

Center, Spokane, Washington, commencing at or about

17

1:30 p.m. on December 3, 1987, pursuant to the

18

Washington Rules of Civil Procedure.

19
20

APPEARANCES

21

FOR THE PLAINTIFF

22

JONES, WALDO, H0LBR00K
MCDONOUGH, P.C.

&

BY:

James S. Lowrle
George Pratt
Attorneys at Law
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah ' 84101
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1

I manager.

I was the production manager.

It

2

I w a s — M e r c u r was part of it.

3

I Dnnurr (phonetic), which is in southwestern Utah,

4

I was an ongoing project and it was actually equal to

6

I or further along than Mercur at that time.

6

I there were a number of small projects that Getty

7

I was Involved in, also, all in the United States.

8

] Q.

9

J projects that were ongoing in the United States

Pine Grove, Maulrrt

You were the production manager for all of the

10

District?

11

A.

12

I Q.

13

A.

14

I Q.

15

J August of 19S0,'While you were still at

16

J Petrotomics, did you have any involvement or

17

J dealings with the Mercur project?

18

A.

And

Yes.
Out of the Salt Lake City office?
Yes.
Before you were moved to that position in

Not directly.

In meetings.with Getty Oil

19

I Company and reviewing their reports that they sent

20

I ^hai'f through, don't ask me what kind of reports, I

21

I don't remember, but I remember Mercur Gold.

22

I we have an annual budget meeting that was held in

23

I September of 1979.

24

I Group gave a presentation on Mercur indicating

25

I rough ideas of tonnage and so on.

Also,

The Getty Corporate Minerals

I
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1

projects to estimate the cost of reclaiming those

2

projects.

S

Q.

That was as an Independent contractor to Getty?

4

A.

As an independent contractor.

B

for Getty, but I was paid by Getty for doing that

6

contract work.

7

Q.

8

had authority to bind Getty to contracts?

9

A.

I don't think so.

10

Q.

During your time with Getty, would you, in

11

order to do your job for Getty, would you regularly

12

seek out the advice of any of the Getty attorneys

13

that we've talked about?

14

A.

15

Berg a lot.

16

Q.

You talked to the other attorneys, as well?

17

A.

I did probably on specific jobs on the day we

18

were working on4

19

don't even remember which one of the other two

20

attorneys were working on, say, Mercur or Pine

21

Grove.

22

office there and that was a separate group, and

23

these attorneys did work for the coal group, too,

24

so I don't remember who was *fcfe^» ^ C

I didn't speak

And since you left Getty in 1983 you have not

Oh, yes, primarily Joe Berg.

I talked to Joe

I can't remember any of them.

See, we also had a coal division in the

25

&***£*& •

Yes, we met with our attorneys quite
20
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PRATT/HAUTALA

1

I often.

2

I Q.

3

I at least for attorneys is sensitive, which is the

4

I so-called attorney-client privilege, and before we

5

I get into that area, which will occupy us for

6

I several minutes, I want you to know that unless I

7

I tell you to the contrary, I don't want to know what

B

I was said during any conversations you had with any

9

I Getty attorneys while you were employed by Getty.

We're going to be treading in an area here that

10

I It may be that I'll ask certain questions and then

11

I I'll ask you to tell me what was said during your

12

J particular conversation, but unless I say to the

13

J contrary, please don't tell me that, because Getty

14

J is entitled to have that information protected,

15

J assuming it was properly protected to begin with,

16

I just as kind of a caution*

17

MR, CLARK:

May I interject something,

IB

I George, and that is that, Mr. Hautala, at this

19

I point I think it is especially important for you to

20

J listen very carefully.

21

I going to phrase his questions carefully, so you

22

I need to listen carefully to his questions and not

23

I volunteer more than what he asks you, simply

24

I because of the sensitivity that he's just

25

I described.
I

,sw

I know that Mr. Pratt is

21
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MR. PRATT:

I think that f s fair.

1

I

2

I Q.

3

I the content of any conversations were, what were

4

I the general subject matter areas that you would

5

I have caused to have discussion with Getty's

6

I attorneys?

7

I A.

Contracts, press release, land.

8

J Q.

Land titles, that sort of thing?

9

I A.

The general land acquisition problems which go

(BY MR. PRATT)

Without telling me, again, what

10

I along with any mining venture.

I am going to

11

J volunteer this.

12

I cannot really remember in the general sense.

13

I Q.

14

I Mr. Joe Berg?

I am sure there's other things I

You said that your contacts were primarily with

15

A.

Yes.

16

I Q.

17

I weekly basis?

18

I A.

19

I that Joe was gone and I was gone a lot from the

20

I office, so we weren't there.

21

I in the office, I am sure we said at least hello

22

I every day.

23

I Q.

24

I was coming to get information or that you were

25

I going to him for advice, or was it a little bit of

Would that have been on a daily basis or a

It almost was on a daily basis, remembering

But when we were both

Primarily were your interactions such that he

22
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1

| five years ago.

2

I Q.

3

I conversations you had with any of the other Getty

4

I lawyers that we identified earlier on In the

5

I deposition?

6

I A.

7

I that, given a chance to refresh my memory, I could

8

I at least bring up the general views that were

9

J discussed or opinions.

10

Can you recall the specifics of any

I couldn't recall the specifics.

I am sure

But for me to go back and

J try to pick one out of the air, it would be very

11

difficult.

12

J Q.

It's been some time now?

13

I A.

Five years.

14

I Q.

Those details fade after a period of time.

15

J take it that while you were doing your job in Salt

16

J Lake City the conversations that you had with

17

I attorneys were not special to you?

IS

I A.

I don't get what you mean.

19

I Q.

I don't blame you.

20

I reason why conversations that you had with

21

I attorneys during that time would stand out in your

22

I mind any more than conversations that you had with

23

I anyone else?

24

I A.

25

I say, I can't remember the specific conversations.

There's no particular

I don't know that I'd agree with that.

I

Like I

49
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1

I However, whether we were dealing with issues; for

2

I example, if there were a land issue that was frftippr

3

I to a project, I can remember the general aspects of

4

I that land issue.

5

I and maybe who was even present when the discussion

6

I was given--

7

I Q.

Or who said what to whom?

8

I A.

That is right.

9

J that.

But to remember when it occurred

I couldn't probably remember

I probably could remember the general

10

I aspects of what the attorney recommended, and I can

11

I do that.

12

I Q.

13

I Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough?

14

I A.

15

I Parson, Behle and Latimer.

16

I documents.

17

I Q.

18

I Jones, Waldo to the best of your knowledge

19

I documents that were created in order to secure

20

I legal advice?

21

I A.

No.

22

I Q.

Did any of the documents that were provided to

23

I Jones, Waldo contain legal advice?

24

I A.

25

Q.

Have you provided any documents to Jones,

Yes.

I did.

It was after a meeting with
I believe I sent some

Were any of the documents that you provided to

No.
While you were at Jones, Waldo did you sign
50
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,

1

I Jones, Waldo, or even how did you know to send it

2

| to Jones, Waldo?

3

I A.

4

I him documents, as I recall.

5

I things on feasibility to you, n and asked if they'd

6

I be Interested in seeing what I sent, and I think he

7

I told me yes and told me where to send it.

B

I Q.

9

I what you can recall about specific

When I talked to Mr. Pratt I told him I sent
"I am sending these

Mr. Pratt asked you a number of questions about
conversations

10

J with Mr. Berg that you may have had during the

11

J course of your employment

32

J believe you testified that on occasions when you

13

J were in the office you spoke with Mr. Berg on

14

I almost a daily basis, is that right?

there at Getty.

I

15

A.

16

J Q.

17

I indicate that with respect to certain general

IB

J conversations that you had with Mr. Berg that you

19

I can recall the nature of some of those

20

I conversations?

21

I A.

Would you repeat that question again?

22

I Q.

Yes.

23

I also testified that you can recall in general the

24

J subject of some of your conversations with Mr.

25

Yes.
And did I also understand you correctly to

Let me try that again.

I believe you

Berg?
I

66
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1

Yes.

2

I Q.

And in particular, do you recall discussing

3

I items with Mr. Berg that relate, or at that time

4

I related, to the relationship between Getty and Gold

5

I Standard?

6

I A.

7

I Standard and Getty, yes.

8

I Q.

Go ahead.

9

I A.

And what is required and so forth.

10

J Q.

So you did have conversations of that nature

If you mean that, the agreement between Gold

11

with Mr. Berg, is that right?

12

A.

13

I Q.

14

I with Mr. Berg on more than one occasion?

Yes.
And did you have conversations on that subject

15

A.

Yes.

16

I Q.

17

J topic of many of the conversations that you had

And would it be fair to say that that was a

IB

with Mr. Berg?

19

A.

20

J Q.

21

I that you had with Mr. Berg, might it be possible

22

I that you have information that came to you from Mr.

23

I Berg, but that you are now unable to recall the

24

I source?

25

I

Yes.
Given the extensive nature of the conversations

MR. LOWRIE:

,sw

Read that question back.
67
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1

I

(Record read as requested.)

2

I

3

I speculation.

4

I A.

5

I of specifics.

6

I Q.

7

I the offices of Jones, Waldo, was there any

B

I particular subject matter that you were asked not

9

I to talk about with Mr. Pratt and Mr. Lowrie?

MR. PRATT:

It's possible.

Objection, calls for

I was pondering trying to think

Certainly it's possible.

(BY MR. CLARK)

At the meeting that you had at

10

I A.

I can't remember any.

11

J Q.

Was there any item whatsoever that they

12

J indicated that they did not want you to talk about?

13

J A.

I can't remember anything.

14

J Q.

I think you indicated that when you met with

15

Mr. Pratt, Mr. Lowrie, that it was Mr. Smith who

16

telephoned you and asked or called to make the

17

I arrangements for you to do that, is that right?

18

I A.

19

I asked if I would be willing to come down and talk

20

I to the attorneys.

21

I Q.

22

I Mr. Smith relating to this lawsuit?

23

I A.

24

J Mr. Smith and myself, however, oftentimes they're

25

J not even involving a lawsuit.

Again, the best I can recall, it was Smith who

Do you recall ever making a telephone call to

I can't.

There have been phone calls between

I

I may have at one
68
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1

I Q.

(BY MR. CLARK)

Is that your understanding

2

I now?

S

I A.

4

I sure I know that clearly rather than here.I am

I would have to have private counsel to make

)

V
5

I getting a gist that that is what It's supposed to

6

I be.

7

J context because of the different kinds of

B

I conversations.

9

I Q.

It f s a difficult thing for me to put into

I take it that it would be your view that in

10

I order to even determine what might be protected by

11

J the attorney-client privilege that you would not be

12

I personally in a position to make that

13

I determination?

14

MR. PRATT:

15

I conclusion.

16

I

17

I

IB

J A.

19

Q.

Calls for a legal

MR. LOWRIE:

Read the question back.

(Record read as requested.)
I agree, yes.
(BY MR. CLARK)

And you indicated, however, I

20

I believe In your testimony, that when you reach a

21

I certain level of responsibility In a company that

22

I you do develop a sense that certain matters ought

23
24
25

I to be kept confidential; did you say that?
A. Yes.
I Q. Has it your view when you were employed by
75
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1

I asked for that letter," and I doh't know if they

2

I told me.

3

I said yes.

4

I Q.

They said yes to--

5

I A.

That there were other Getty people that they

6

I had received the letter referring to not to be

7

I contacted.

B
9

Q.

I think that f s all it was '. I think they

Do you recall whether they told you at that

J time that Getty had made a general request of them

10

I not to contact former Getty employees?

11

J A.

12

I that conversation.

13

I bel1 to me.

14

I Q.

15

I entitled to have lawyers present when you were

16

J talking to Mr. Lowrie or Mr. Pratt?

I don't recall it.

It could have come up in

It certainly didn f t strike a

And were you ever advised that Getty may be

17

MR. LOWRIE:

Not by us.

We will

IB

I stipulate that is the case because we do not

19

I believe that to be the law.

20

I Q.

21

I question.

(BY MR. CLARK)

You can still answer my

Were you advised of that by them?

22

A.

No.

23

I Q.

24

I Lowrie about what may or may not be privileged,

25

I attorney-client privileged

Was there any discussion with Mr. Pratt or Mr.

information?

I

Bl
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CLARK/HAUTALA
A.

No.

2

I Q.

Were you specifically asked to refrain from

3

I giving attorney-client privilege

4

I

5

I A.

No.

6

I Q.

(BY MR. CLARK)

7

J want to have an attorney present to represent your

8

J own interests in any of these meetings?

9

I A.

MR. PRATT:

information?

Asked and answered.

Did they tell you that you may

I don't remember that coming up in any of the

10

I meetings I f ve attended, with Parson, Behle or with

11

| Jones, Waldo.

12

I Q.

13

I Lowrie that the complaint

14

I allegations against John Doe defendants?

15

I A.

16

I but who told me that I can't remember, or if it

17

I just came up recently.

18

J don't remember it being brought up in that meeting

19

Were you told at any time by Mr. Pratt or Mr.
in this matter included

Somewheres along the line that rings a bell,

at all.

x^S^v^^J

%**<

I honestly don't know.

«A

>\XUs ik«6e>*;4-ttr*% '

20

J Q.

21

I Lowrie that your interests may be adverse to the

22

I interest of Gold Standard?

23

I A.

Were you ever advised by Mr. Pratt or Mr.

No.

24
25

I

MR-

?RATT:

I think he was advised this

J morning that he would not be a defendant in this
B2
rrj M
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1

deposition before?

2

A

Yes, I have.

3

Q

Can you tell roe when that was?

4
5

tiroes, first of all*
A

How many

I'm sorry.

Probably only made a deposition once.

6

That was in, oh, probably around 1980, but I have

7

testified in court in Delaware for a two day

8

session, I think in 1983, I believe.

9

Q

Was that testimony in court of the

10

deposition in connection with your employment with

11

Getty?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Would you briefly outline for roe your

14

employment history with Getty, when you commenced,

15

what positions you held and when you ceased working

16

for Getty?

17

A

Yes.

I came with Getty in the middle of

18

June of 1968 and I've forgotten what title I held at

19

that time, but I was a senior mining geologist in

20

exploration, and in 19 -• about seven years later,

21

seven or eight years later, I became the minerals

22

engineering manager, transferred out of exploration

23

into -- into our mining development and mining group

24

and that's the position I held until I left in the

25

fall of 1984.

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

Q

2
3

What were the circumstances of your

leaving in the fall of 1984?
1

A

We had been taken over by Texaco and they

4

were in the process of selling the mining division

5

and I was of such an age that I could take an early

€

retirement and two of us asked to get out without

7

staying on another, oh, six months or a year,

8

whatever the case may be, and we were able to

9

arrange that.

10
11

Q

So unlike some of the other Getty

employees, you weren't discharged?

12

A

No.

No, I retired early.

13

Q

You said you were manager of minerals

14

engineering?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

You acquired that position sometime

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

around 1976; is that correct?
A

Yeah, f75 or '76.

I, frankly, am a

little bit vague.
Q

Can you tell me what that position

entailed?
A

Yes.

At that time we had -- I was

responsible for our mine, our uranium mine in
I Wyoming and also all the engineering activities that
went on with any of our projects that were in the

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

development stage, including the Jabiluka uranium

2

project in Australia, our copper prospect in

3

Arizona.

4

functions of the mining group.

5

gentleman was made -- I reported directly to the

6

vice-president at that time.

7

at the next level and I no longer reported to the

8

vice-president.

All of it.

All of*the engineering
Later another

Someone else came in

I reported to him.

9

Q

Was the vice-president Mr. Mintz?

10

A

No.

11

reported to.

12

Q

13

reported to?

14

A

Jack was -- he was the manager I

Jack was not a vice-president.

Who was the vice-president that you

Well, there were several of them.

15

Carlton was one; Carlos, Don Carlos; McKinley, Glen

16

McKinley, and the last one was Ed Wendt.

17
18
19

Q

And then Mr. Mintz came in between you

and Mr. Wendt at some point; is that correct?
A

I think it was McKinley at that --

20

Carlos.

No, it was Carlos at that time,^was the

21

vice-president.

22

Q

Can you tell me when that was?

23

A

Oh, brother.

24
25

'79 or '80.

I'm not sure.

Probably '79.
Q

Can you tell me what corporation you

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

had been responsible for our Jabiluka uranium

2

deposit for several years and this was really the

3

crux of the matter.

4

the lawsuit, gosh, our chief counsel, I'm sure,

5

would be responsible for that, not us.

6

Q

As far as responsibility for

But were you ever called upon to make any

7

decisions with respect to the conduct of the

8

litigation, how it would be handled, what approach

9

would be taken?

10

A

No.

11

Q

Mow, aside from these, was there any

12

other litigation that you were involved in in

13

connection with your position as roanager-of mining

14

engineering for Getty?

15

A

Yes.

We had two or three -- I've

16

forgotten exactly how many -- small problems where

17

we built the shop out at Shirley Basin, Wyoming.

18

was about a $7 million installation and we had some

19

subcontractor problems and we had several —

20

three cases of litigation involved there and I was

21

totally responsible for those.

22
23
24
25

Q

It

two or

These were garden variety construction

claim cases, were they?
A

Mo.

One of them was rather serious.

Our

principal contractor had installed a series of

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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fiberglass tanks and these came out of the ground
and we were a little bit concerned*

These were very

expensive and they were all broken and we had quite
a -- it took us awhile to resolve that one.
Q

Do you know what the others were?

Were

they fairly typical of the construction project
sort, of cost overruns or backcharge claims or "you
didn't give us the right specs"?
A

Yes.

Q

Were these involving a major claim

against the supplier?
A

No.

It was our principal contractor.

Q

Aside from the litigation that we've

talked about, did you consult on a daily basis with
lawyers?
A

I avoided them as often as I could.

Mot

on a daily basis but more on -- oh, several times a
month, at least, because we had contracts -- when
the exploration people negotiated a deal with a
prospector, we reviewed the contract as part of our
minerals production responsibility.

All exploration

contracts we reviewed to make sure that sometime
down the road if this thing ever became a mine there
wasn't anything in there that we couldn't live with.
We reviewed all those, all those

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

exploration contracts and that was part of our —

2

in that vein we would be in contact with lawyers

so

tfr

3

^ t * our legal staff, and also at least every year,

4

seriously, the wording for the 10-K and the wording

5

for the annual report, I was responsible for that in

6

the mining, in the minerals group, and there was a

7

lot of exchange with our legal department on that.

8

Q

9
10

In 1973 did you have responsibilities

with respect to the formation of contracts with
prospectors?

11

A

No.

12

Q

Then you did not participate in any

13

review prior to the formation of a joint operating

14

agreement between Getty and Gold Standard in that

15

year, did you?

16

A

No.

17

Q

I would like to have you describe for me,

18

if you will, your responsibilities with respect to

19

the Mercur project that Getty had.

20
21
22
23

I

A

As of when?

Q

From start to finish, in a brief overview

first, if you can.
A

When I became the minerals engineering

24

manager, I think in 1975 —

25

there.

I could be off a year

I think that's when it was.

—
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Mercur had

29

specific.

I'm sure I probably talked to Jack Sample

on occasion but I don't remember anything that we
focused on.

It may have been just general terms.

MR. CLARK:

I will request of you, Mr.

Kundert, that you not reveal any of those
conversations to the extent that you had them.
MR. CROCKETT:

That isn't the fact.

That's the content, that you not reveal the content.
Q

(By Mr. Lowrie)

At this point, I would

make the same request of you, that in answering
questions that call for the fact of the conversation
that you not tell me about the content of the
conversation .
Aside from the possibility of
conversations with Mr. Sample with respect to the
content of reports to the Securities and Exchange
Commission indicating shareholders in connection
with securities matters, do you recall whether or
not you had any conversations with any Getty lawyers
with respect to the Mercur project?
MR. CLARK:

I'm going to object to that.

I think it mischaracterizes his testimony.

He said

that he had conversations, not that there was a
possibility of conversations.
MR. LOWRIE:

No.

He said the' possibility

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

of conversations.

2

MR. CLARK:

And I think the question

3

invites disclosure of the subject of the

4

communications and would object to the question on

5

that basis and request of the witness that the

6

subject of the communications not be disclosed,

7

Q

8

(By Mr. Lowrie)

Now, do you have the

question I asked you in mind?

9

A

Mo.

10

Q

First of all, do I correctly understand

11

that you do not recall for sure whether or not you

12

discussed Mercur with Jack Sample prior to October,

13

1980?

14

A

That's correct.

15

Q.

Now, I gather that generally one of your

16

reasons for talking with counsel for Getty was in

17

connection with the 10-K; is that correct?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

Aside from the possibility of discussion

20

of Mercur with Mr. Sample with respect to the 10-K,

21

are you able to affirmatively tell me that you did

22

not discuss Mercur with lawyers, including Mr.

23

Sample, prior to October 1, 1980?

24
25

I

A

I can't be that positive because at that

meeting which you asked about earlier, when I met

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

Mr. Smith the only tine, there was a lawyer there.

2

I think —

3

I'm sure Getty had a lawyer there and

I maybe in the ensuing few weeks after that I may have

4

talked to one of our lawyers.

5

that I can remember.

6

Q

Okay.

That's the only time

I'd like to ask you some rather

7

specific questions, if I may, Mr. Kundert.

Do you

8

recall a lawyer for Getty during the course of the

9

time that you were employed with Getty and with

10

respect to the Mercur project ever stating to youf

11

"I need information from you with respect to the

12

Mercur project in order to give legal advice to the

13

corporation," or words to that effect?

14

MR. CLARK:

I'm going to object to that

15

question on the basis that it calls specifically for

16

disclosure of material that would be protected by

17

the attorney-client privilege.

18

MR. LOWRIE:

Well, then will you

19

stipulate that you will not try to make such a

20

showing that any such questions were ever put to Mr.

21

Kundert in connection with the pending motion, Mr.

22

Clark?

23
24
25

MR. CLARK:
so stipulate.

I don't believe that we will

I'm not sure what we will do.

MR. LOWRIE:

I'm going to request that

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

Wilson or Mr. Pratt, and I don't remember which one,

2

had —

3

to visit or had visited Jack Mintz and I don't

4

remember which one.

5

one of them told me that he had —

Q

6

Other than that, no.

All right.
MR. LOWRIE:

7

was going

And we will represent to you

that it wasn't Mr. Pratt.

8

Q

9

(By Mr. Clark)

When you had your

conversation with Mr. Pratt, do you remember, did he

10

ask you to expressly avoid telling him about any

11

conversations with Mr. Berg or Mr. Sample?

12

A

No.

13

Q

And at any time in any of your

14

conversations with Mr. Pratt, did he advise you that

15

Getty may have an interest in what you say and that

16

you would have the right to have either your own or

17

Getty's counsel present?

18

A

Not that I recall, no.

19

Q

Let's talk for a minute about the

20

affidavit

21

that you wouldn't have signed that unless it's true;

22

is that right?

23

I

24
25

A

itself.

I think you've already

indicated

As I believed at the time and still do,

this is factual, yes.
I

Q

Do you remember what changes that you

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

A

I'm sure I did.

2

Q

And did Mr. Pratt show you a copy of the

A

Again, I know at least one of the lawyers

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

i. tsu a
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Pratt as •
the requirement
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1

feasibility study was equated with dollars, the

2

definition of what a feasibility w a s , and the

3

dollars had been spent, so as far as my personal

4

view was concerned, that was a feasibility study in

5

keeping with the agreement.

€

I

Q

In your own view then, does the Bechtel

7

report satisfy the operating agreement in that

8

particular

9

regard?
MR. LOWRIE:

10

the discovery

11

That is beyond the scope of

in this deposition.

MR. CLARK:

I believe that's fairly

12

opened by your questions and, in addition, that

13

would not be beyond the scope of this deposition if

14

he told that to Mr. Pratt.

15

MR. LOWRIE:

Well, since there's no judge

16

here, I guess I'll just make my objection.

17

govern yourself accordingly.

18

need to fight with you with respect to that.

19

MR. CLARK:

You can

I don't know that I

You can answer the question.

20

I

THE WITNESS:

21

J you read the question please?

22

I

(Question read back by the reporter.)

23

|

THE WITNESS:

24

I agreement, yes, it does.

25

I

Q

(By Mr. Clark)

(To the Reporter)

Would

As I read the operating

Are you aware that there
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OCXJRT
IN AND FOR SAET IAKE OCUHTy, STATE OF UTAH

GOLD STANDARD, INC.,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN BARRICK RESOURCES
CORPORATION; BARRICK MURCUR
GOLDMINES, INC.; TEXACO,
INC.; GETIY OIL COMPANY; and
JOHN DOES 1 through 10,

CftSE NO. CV86-374

Defendants.

Defendants, Getty Oil Ctocpany and Getty Mining Company (hereafter
"Getty"), asks this Court to impose sanctions upon the plaintifffs lawyers
claiming they conducted ex parte interviews with former managerial-level
employees of Getty, in violation of ER7-104(A) (1) of the Code of
Professional Conduct.

(ER7-104 (A) (1) is substantially identical to current

Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted January 1, 1988). The
Court has reviewed the memoranda sufciaitted by the parties together with the
attachments, including the depositions of Charles J. Kundert and Robert L.
Hautala. Ihe Court took the matter under advisement after oral arguments
and new being fully advised rules as follows:
Ohe question is whether DR7-104(A) (1) applies to former employees of a
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corporation that is a party involved in litigation and represented by an
attorney. DR7-104 (A) (1) provides as follows:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer
shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to cexnraunicate on the subject
of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by
a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the
lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do
so.
It is concededfcyplaintiff's lawyers that they have made ex parte
contacts with and have interviewed two of defendant, Gettys1, former
employees, Charles Kundert and Robert L. Hautala. It is also conceded that
both of these employees were in a managerial capacity with Getty and had
sane direct involvement with the circumstances giving rise to the litigation
at issue.
Recognizing a split of authority on this issue, the Ccurt is, of the
opinion that ER7-104(A) (1) and Rule 4.2 do not apply to ex parte contacts
with former employees of a party. She question becomes who is a ••party" so
as to receive the protection of the rule. If the party is an individual,
the question is easily answered. If, however, as in this case, the named
party is a corporation, it becomes more difficult to determine which of the
current employees and whether any former employees come within the
protection of the rule.
The purpose of the rule is to ensure that any represented party involved
in litigation receives the counsel and advice of its lawyer on all matters
that may have a bearing on the outcome of the litigation. It is jbmportant
that an attorney control the flew of information from his client to opposing
counsel to ensure against the client doing or saying something that may have
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a detrimental effect on that client1 s position in the lawsuit without the
advice of counsel. If an enplcyee, whether or not in a managerial capacity,
may do anything that can bind the corporation or may say anything that under
the Rules of Evidence may be deemed an admission and imputed to the
employer, then the purpose of the rule canes into play and that employee
should not be contacted without the consent of the attorney. If the
employee is not in a position to bind the company or to say anything that
would be deemed an admission and attributable to the company* then, even
though that enplcyee is a current enplcyee, there may be ex parte contacts
by opposing counsel. There is no reason for counsel to control the flew of
information fron that employee inasmuch as he or she can say or do nothing
that will be imputed to the corporation.
Ex parte contacts by opposing counsel,, under those circumstances
mentioned above, where the employee cannot bind the employer, do not deny
the employer the benefit of its attorney any more than ex parte contacts by
opposing counsel with any other non-enployee witness. The same may be said
of former employees. Former employees generally do not have the ability to
bind the corporation by anything that they may do, nor, under the Rules of
Evidence, can anything that they say be deemed to be an admission and
inputted to their former employer. The purpose for the rule, therefore, is
irrelevant under those circumstances. Since the former enplcyee can no
longer bind the employer and can no longer say anything that would be deemed
to be an admission by the employer, the employer's counsel should no longer
have the right to control the flew of information from that witness. While
it is true that the information provided by that witness may be prejudicial
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.In i the employerf s counsel, t o

-. .. information from *^i* ^iuiesi- *Miy wore than i t would b e
••tsont.* allcw t h e errployer's attorner *:o rjorrtrpl *I» J Miw ',»f J npuni
frur

t

* wno nad prejudicial infornaticn.
Moreover, the court recognizes a legitimate interest ^ illcwinq M"*mi'^l

t o gather information in an inform
tgith<«ii tilf

>

-

-

warmer

inUMimxin: ot opposing counsel, so long' as. their' conduct: does

not deny a party the benefit of their attorney.
Gettys" attorneys, m puilo! irm i if ih<> wujeis <a ex patte contacts with
w ifcjryjss*«( ii'Ir I«I !u Hie a f f i d a v i t %A LhaiJes Ktmdert. obtained by
plaintiff 1 ,*, munsel. in an ex p a r t e IntprviM-/

Itvv flnim that" I hi* rtffiiLr • I

"ti,' be misleading and may inrlpol -t^ni, h * u u « cpiuLuns tJidt in lf•*•
fYiFitpx* HI

ie ex p a r t e interview d i e t h e ' p p o s i t e of t h e a f f i a n t 1 * ai?r« • L

opinion on t h e same issue and that, t h i s apparent iirsonsistainjv .J* 1**1.11^*3
attrifcutablI

1i ll>' riiilrt It* t-irainaii|i«• . ui tjit; interviewing a t t e n d

While

IIin uuurL l^ n a t u r a l l y concerned about any conduct which may tpjvl t o distrut
t h e t r u t h - s e e k i n g purposes of discovery, nevertheless

these «h?- dangers

t h a t exii:;t" \\\ ii:r rw jkiae txxitacts !jy counsel with any witnesses whether
employees, former employees, or non-employee bystander witnesses.
Furthermore, sane r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ~
investig* * <

. .... ^*,^a_* manner.

* *Li*vr opposing

counsel t o b e p r e s e n t during any interview of any witness by opposing
counsel, to guard a g a i n s t t h e dangen- H »H | m w n m t d u t s , would obviously
ki¥,jfJii-»iii .1

. expensive d (lt><xwery process t h a t i s arguably

.riln'-ady t o o expensive, t o o complicated, and t o o burdensonie.
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i"-,iii.wiis stated above, Hie Court r u l e s t h a t counsel i s not

prohibited from making ex p a r t e contacts with farmer employees of the
defendant.
A second and equally important matter i s t h e issue of p r i v i l e g e d
Some of t h e former employees \ihcm p l a i n t i f f f s ha1 /e

cxxrioitiications.
contacted

*

been p a r t i e s t o

privileged cxanraurdcations d u n m u*- time t h a t they were employed by
defendant Getty.

Hiose cxraminications would continuo in hn priw) ]t\y\i

tliM rlpfendrini h uhi MIII III in in > mini u e t p i I V J l e g e ,

r\nl

'llie obligor ion imposed

on p l a i n t i f f ' s attorneys i s not t o inquire into any privileged
cxxtnunications.
After leadliiy the mitv\ n i t . uuUidtted by t h e p a r t i e s , i t appears t h a t
p l a i n t i f f f s counsel lias not inquired i n t o privileged matters nor i s thorn
any s u b s t a n t i a l evidenof" that in iviliqed (uiiniumcdt ions IMVP IJOGII divulged.
"I tit* LOUJ I , huwever, wil I i q>iin.- ilia! before any ex p a r t e interviews, a r e
conducted by former enjj.h*yi'-*oi* of the deferxtantf*' that i clear winiitri }'<•
made t h a t p l a i n t i f f "fi
IkifliAi'ii 1J it."

i«insHi i," III i illiinfi11 I IIIim mi Jiiiiif<

InUivic'woi' »ynj the enp'\

inn / cxatnraunications

I lyeip s cxunsel t h a t may be p r i v i l e g e d

and further t h a t t h e interviewee i s not to divulge any such comraunications.
In addition

i mi i i I i i 1 v .1 11 <i 1t\ I m »r 1i1 1 M I I 111»

1 i

11 i I i steii tun any

t>udi i-umiunlLciLiuri^.
Based cm t h e foregoing, the court, will deny tJhe defendants" nequnrit for
sanctions.
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memorandum deci
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loosing counsel for approval and then to

!••..' '.:o\irt !oi signature in accordance with the local rules of practice.
Dated this

(Q

day of April, 198fl.

.,
Frank G. Noel
District Court Judge
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GOLD STANDARD, INC.,
ORDER DENYING GETTY
PETITION FOR ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
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vs.
AMERICAN BARRICK RESOURCES
CORPORATION; BARRICK MERCUR
GOLD MINES, INC.; TEXACO, INC.
(a severed party); GETTY OIL
COMPANY; GETTY MINING COMPANY,
GETTY GOLD MINE COMPANY; and
JOHN DOES I through 10,
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